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Practices and procedures regarding clearing
and central counterparty services provided
by derivatives clearing houses in the United
States and the European Union are
currently undergoing a process of evolution.
Developments in technology and electronic
commerce, advances in the design and use of
derivative products, progress in financial risk
management techniques related to derivatives
exposures and an increase in the volume of
cross-border trading in securities and
derivatives have prompted some market
participants to advocate the development
of clearing arrangements and central
counterparty services on an international, i.e.
cross-border, basis. The development of these
services aims at permitting as efficient a use of
capital as possible on a global or international
basis, while – at the same time – maintaining
the financial soundness of existing clearing
arrangements. The most significant trends fall
into two categories: on the one hand,
developments in operational arrangements
between clearing houses, in particular at a
cross-border level, and, on the other,
horizontal and vertical structural consolidation
in the clearing and settlement infrastructure. 
In general, trends in the development of
derivatives clearing reflect efforts to permit
direct access to the clearing house
electronically, without requiring their physical
presence in the clearing house’s jurisdiction
or, alternatively, efforts by the clearing house
to extend its operations beyond a single
market through cross margining or their
arrangements. Exchange-traded derivatives
markets have always attracted a certain level
of international participation. From a business
perspective, trends in the development of
derivatives clearing reflect innovations in the
manner in which international traders gain
access to the markets and their associated
clearing systems. These innovations are
calculated to reduce the costs of trading on
the markets and to attract an increased level
of international trading.
The ongoing consolidation process in the field
of clearing and settlement adds an additional
element of complexity to the analysis of
current developments. On the one hand,
consolidation helps increase the efficiency
of the clearing and settlement process. On
the other hand, the potential systemic
consequences of a central counterparty’s
failure increase with its size.
Developments in clearing present numerous
challenges to central banks and derivatives
regulators. Central banks have an interest in
clearing houses and the payment and
settlement systems through which derivatives
contracts are cleared and settled, given the
potential impact a major disruption may have
on two of their key responsibilities, namely the
smooth implementation of monetary policy
and the smooth functioning of payment
systems.1 In addition to these systemic
implications, derivatives regulators are
concerned with the potential non-systemic
impact of a significant failure within the
clearing and settlement infrastructure on the
financial condition of individual regulated firms
and on the protection of individual customers
using and holding derivatives positions through
the clearing and settlement infrastructure. 
When assessing the implications of these
recent developments, it is interesting to
compare the existing organisation of domestic
clearing arrangements in the United States and
the European Union, and to analyse both the
similarities and dissimilarities in their
development. The similarities reflect a variety
of factors. The development of electronic
technology and electronic communications
capabilities that potentially permit 24-hour
trading internationally and the development
and international acceptance of common risk
management models and related computer
software for derivatives and cash market
products have led to an increase in cross-
border trading activity. This, in turn, has led to
an increased demand by international investors
for maximum cost efficiency in clearing
arrangements and for maximum efficiency in
Executive summary
1 In a press release of 27 September 2001, the ECB provided a
comprehensive note which explains the Eurosystem’s policy
approach with regard to consolidation in central counterparty
clearing within the euro area. Moreover, in August 2001, the
ECB published an article on this topic in its Monthly Bulletin.the use of capital in the acquisition and
collateralisation of securities, derivatives, and
other financial instruments. However,
investors, intermediaries, clearing houses,
financial market regulators and central banks
all also insist that these cost efficiencies be
achieved in a manner consistent with effective
risk management. Finally, the development of
niche and special-purpose or limited-access
markets requires the organisation of efficient
corresponding clearing arrangements.
The dissimilarities reflect some other factors.
Competition between exchanges and antitrust
law considerations as well as legal and
regulatory impediments to the combined
clearing of certain kinds of products in the
United States have had the most significant
influence on the organisation of clearing
arrangements there. The diversity in the size
and scope of the markets and in the types
of market participants in the United States
and the European Union has also had a
significant influence on the organisation of
clearing. In the European Union, the main
factor motivating the evolution of clearing
arrangements is the ongoing process of
European economic integration, mainly
triggered by the introduction of the euro, the
ongoing organisation of an internal market for
financial services and the corresponding
objective of creating a pan-European financial
infrastructure for payments and securities
settlements. Since changes in the clearing and
settlement infrastructure inevitably involve an
evolution of the business opportunities and
roles of various market participants and
service providers (not to mention the roles of
central banks, banking supervisors and financial
market regulators), many parties often have an
interest in perpetuating the existing business
and regulatory arrangements associated with
clearing and settlement. As a result, a
fundamental restructuring of the clearing and
settlement infrastructure often requires a
catalyst with an impact sufficient to override
these competing interests. In the euro area,
the introduction of the euro is acting as such a
catalyst. Indeed, the dynamics associated with
the evolution of the internal market in the
euro area and the adoption of the euro
provide a strong motivation to reorganise and
rationalise clearing and settlement
arrangements and the financial infrastructure
within the euro area. These dynamics are
largely absent in the United States; the United
States’ financial infrastructure for equities
clearing and settlement is already structured
on a national basis, pursuant to the national
market system instituted subsequent to the
adoption of prescriptive amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The adoption
of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 permits certain over-the-counter
(OTC) instruments to be cleared and provides
for the possibility of trading in identical futures
contracts developing in multiple markets and
of futures clearing houses competing for
business from different markets. These
legislative innovations may to some extent
operate as a catalyst for the evolution of
clearing arrangements in the United States.
The differing circumstances explain, in part,
the greater vigour with which Europe is
currently pursuing a course of consolidation in
clearing and settlement arrangements and of
further developments in the regulation of
financial services in general.
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and central counterparty services are currently
undergoing a process of evolution in Europe2
and in the United States. These innovations
present numerous challenges to central banks
and financial market regulators. 
Central banks have an interest in the field of
securities and derivatives clearing systems for
several reasons. First, in Europe, clearing
houses are increasingly providing services that
were previously provided mainly by securities
settlement systems, such as the matching and
netting of trades and settlement orders. These
activities may have systemic risk implications in
cases of mismanagement. Assessing and
adopting policies to address potential sources
of systemic risk are key functions of central
banks. Second, unlike securities depositories,
central counterparty clearing houses assume
risk in respect of the default of their
participants. Competition to gain market
penetration could even take the form of
relaxing risk control standards. Third, clearing
houses for derivatives often settle not only
derivatives, but also cash market transactions.
Fourth, central securities depositories and
central counterparty clearing houses often
belong to the same group and share the same
management. If central banks were to focus
exclusively on payment systems, gaps in the
chain of securities clearing and settlement
processes could disrupt the smooth
implementation of monetary policy and the
smooth functioning of payment and settlement
systems. Finally, as critical components of the
overall structure of financial markets, central
counterparty clearing houses have a general
influence on the functioning of these markets.
They can increase the efficiency and stability of
the financial markets to the extent that their
smooth functioning results in a more efficient
use of collateral, lower operational costs and
more liquidity. For instance, the use of central
counterparty clearing houses can reduce the
overall demand for collateral. These effects are
difficult to predict, however, and depend on
several features of the market (e.g. market
concentration, structure of participation in the
clearing system, degree of collateralisation of
the financial markets).3
Since the introduction of the euro, there has
been a growing demand for central
counterparty clearing house services in the
euro area. The Eurosystem has been carefully
monitoring developments in this area. The
Eurosystem shares the view of the Committee
of the Wise Men on the regulation of
securities markets that the process of
consolidation in central counterparty clearing
should, in general, be driven by the private
sector. It also shares the view that in case of
an inability of the private sector to deliver a
pan-European clearing and settlement system,
“a clear public policy orientation would be
needed to move forward.” Against this
background, the Eurosystem released a public
statement, entitled “The Eurosystem’s policy
line with regard to central counterparty
clearing” on 27 September 2001 (see Annex
1). The policy statement and the related
explanatory text are available on the ECB’s
website and are therefore not discussed in this
paper.
This paper focuses instead on a comparison of
the organisation of domestic derivatives
clearing in the European Union and the United
States, with an emphasis on developments in
cross-border clearing arrangements.4
A recent debate among market participants
regarding the development of central
counterparty clearing in Europe has been
dominated by some major global investment
banks, which have expressed support for the
idea of a single European central counterparty
clearing house, which would be multi-currency
and multi-product (i.e. equities, bonds,
1I ntroduction
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2 References to “Europe” in this paper generally refer to the
European Union, unless the context indicates otherwise. 
3 For a discussion of the various functions fulfilled and services
provided by securities settlement systems, clearing houses
and central counterparties, see the CPSS/IOSCO
Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems
(November 2001) at www.bis.org.
4 For the purposes of this analysis, it is not useful to distinguish
between euro area and other EU countries. In fact, the
regulatory framework for securities and derivatives markets is
defined at the EU level and the recently established Committee
of European Securities Regulators also operates at the EU level.
From an operational perspective, there are no significant
differences. Nevertheless, the specific features of the EU’s
largest non-euro area central counterparty clearing house are
described in Annexes 4 to 7.derivatives and commodities).5 One of the
main arguments articulated in this debate is
that the creation of a single central
counterparty in Europe would create clearing
arrangements that mirror those in the United
States, where clearing arrangements are more
consolidated, and therefore more cost-
effective, than in Europe. However, a critical
comparison between the US and European
cases leads to different conclusions in the case
of derivatives. On the one hand, it shows that
the main features of central counterparties in
the two currency areas are not fundamentally
different. On the other hand, when looking at
the level of consolidation, the situation is far
more complex than is commonly thought. In
particular, it may be argued that, in some
respects (including regulatory aspects), clearing
arrangements in the United States are less
integrated than those in Europe. The aim of
this paper is to outline the broad elements of
this complex picture and to provide an
objective assessment of the main strengths and
weaknesses of the clearing arrangements in
the United States and the European Union.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1
explains why issues concerning central
counterparty clearing houses are of direct
concern to central banks and why a
comparison of the European and the US
situation is of interest. Section 2 provides a
comparative overview of the organisation of
derivatives exchanges in the United States and
in Europe. Section 3 focuses on the
organisation of clearing, covering a broad
range of aspects. Section 4 analyses
operational developments in international risk
management practices and arrangements.
Section 5 discusses various forms of structural
consolidation in the clearing and settlement
infrastructure by highlighting the different
approaches taken in the United States and in
Europe. Section 6 is devoted to the roles of
central banks and financial market regulators
regarding clearing and to the challenges they
face as a result of current innovations in
clearing arrangements. Finally, Section 7
summarises some of the main findings.
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5 See, for example, the publications of the European Securities
Forum at http://www.eurosf.com.The trading of futures contracts in Europe has
a long history. There is historical evidence of
the development of futures contracts in the
Netherlands for the trading of tulip bulbs in
the 17th century. The trading of futures
contracts on metals and international
agricultural commodities historically came to
be centred in London. Futures contracts on
agricultural products were also developed and
offered on other exchanges to support
agricultural production and marketing in the
national domestic economy, such as at local
commodity exchanges in Paris, Lille and Le
Havre for the French agricultural markets.
Euronext Paris, the successor to these
exchanges, continues to offer these agricultural
contracts.7 With the recent development of
financial futures products, one or more futures
exchanges generally were organised in each
national jurisdiction within Europe for the
trading of futures based on national money
market interest rates or the interest rate
payable on national government bonds, on
currency exchange rates and on the stock
indices of the national stock exchanges.
Options on individual securities also came to
be traded on exchanges. In several
jurisdictions, the exchange markets for
equities, options and futures, while separate,
are operated by the same management
company. Exchanges, such as Eurex in
Germany, MEFF in Spain, and MIF-MTO in
Italy, have by choice restricted themselves to
offering financial derivatives contracts based on
an underlying financial instrument or reference
value and do not offer contracts based on
The organisation of central counterparty
services for derivatives markets has been
greatly influenced by the current organisation
of the exchange markets and by the
composition and identity of the parties trading
on those markets. Both the exchanges and
their associated clearing houses reflect a long
history of further development.
The most typical basis on which to
differentiate derivatives exchanges is by
reference to the nature of the underlying
products or reference values on which the
derivatives contracts traded on the exchange
are based. Moreover, the types of contract
traded on an exchange will largely also identify
the composition and identity of the parties
that trade on the exchange. An analysis, on
this basis, of exchanges in the United States
and Europe reveals some patterns in the types
of contracts that are traded on individual
exchanges. Overall, however, it is difficult to
identify any definitive pattern. Whether trade
execution is accomplished by an exchange
through open outcry in trading rings or
through the electronic matching of bids and
offers, derivatives exchanges specialise in
providing trade execution services. Once a
derivative exchange has in place the personnel,
procedures, processes and techniques
necessary to provide trade execution services
in connection with derivatives contracts, the
nature of the underlying product or reference
value does not necessarily alter (delimit) the
trade execution function. While the design of
a derivatives contract may require knowledge
of the organisation of the cash market for the
product or instrument underlying the contract
and the organisation of arrangements for the
delivery of the underlying product or
instrument in case the contract would
otherwise not be closed out upon expiration,
a derivatives exchange generally has no
difficulty, if it desires to do so, in designing and
listing contracts and executing trades for
contracts based on various kinds of underlying
products or reference values.6
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2.1 The organisation of derivatives exchanges in Europe
6 See G. Tsetsekos and P. Varangis, “The structure of derivatives
exchanges: lessons from developed and emerging markets,”
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper WPS1887 (28
February 1998), at http://www-wds.worldbank.org, which
contains a compilation of empirical data on the development of
derivatives exchanges, including specifically Tables 3 and 6
regarding the chronology of the introduction of various kinds of
futures contracts and the year of establishment of the more
prominent futures exchanges.
7 In 1988, the Marché à Terme d’Instruments Financiers
(“Matif”), the predecessor of Euronext Paris, began trading
commodities after merging with the local commodity exchanges
in Paris, Lille and Le Havre.
2 The organisation of derivatives
trading in Europe and the
United Statesagricultural or physical commodities. Two
futures exchanges in London offer contracts
related to specific industries, namely the
International Petroleum Exchange for energy-
related products and the London Metals
Exchange for metals. The London International
Financial Futures and Options Exchange offers
both financial futures products and contracts
on both domestic and international agricultural
commodities. Euronext Paris offers both
financial futures products and contracts based
on domestic agricultural commodities. Small
regional commodities exchanges offer futures
contracts on agricultural products that support
specific local agricultural industries, such as the
FC & M, Sociedad Rectora del Mercado de
Futuros y Opciones sobre Cítricos, S.A., in
Valencia, Spain, for citrus products, the Finnish
Options Exchange for paper-related products
and the Warenterminbörse Hanover for
wheat and potatoes.8
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2.2 The organisation of derivatives exchanges in the United States9
In the United States, exchange trading of
futures contracts dates back to the 1850s.
Historically, futures contracts in the United
States were based on agricultural products or
other physical commodities, such as petroleum
products or metals. Over time, the principal
futures markets came to be organised
primarily in two cities, New York and Chicago.
In New York, exchanges were organised
mainly to trade futures contracts on
petroleum products, metals, international
agricultural commodities (such as coffee, sugar
and cocoa) and other domestically produced
agricultural products. In Chicago, exchanges
were organised primarily to trade futures
contracts on agricultural products produced
and marketed in the central United States, for
which Chicago was a major distribution
centre, such as butter, eggs, grains and
livestock. Smaller regional exchanges also were
organised in other cities, such as Minneapolis
and Kansas City, to trade futures contracts on
locally produced agricultural products,
primarily grains.
Approximately thirty years ago, the members
of the Chicago Board of Trade, a futures
exchange, also organised the Chicago Board
Options Exchange as an independent entity for
the trading of listed options on equity
securities. At around that time, in response to
deregulation of currency exchange and interest
rates, the monetary policies adopted by the
Federal Reserve Board and other legislative
changes, the futures exchanges in both New
York and Chicago also began to list financial
futures contracts based on interest rates,
foreign exchange rates and, subsequently,
stock indices. Consequently, many futures
exchanges in the United States offer a mix of
contracts based on both agricultural products
and other physical commodities as well as on
financial instruments, values, indexes or rates.
Some exchanges historically specialised in
futures contracts for particular industries.
However, several exchanges for these specific
industries have merged. For example, the
exchanges for petroleum products and metals
have merged into the New York Mercantile
Exchange, which continues to focus on
contracts for energy products and metals. The
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange and the
New York Cotton Exchange merged under
the corporate structure of the New York
8 The small number of agricultural futures contracts traded in
Europe relative to the United States reflects the different policy
choices and different arrangements in Europe and the United
States for the management of price risk in the agricultural
markets. Developments in agricultural policy, e.g. those arising
from a liberalisation of trade in agricultural products under the
Agreement on the World Trade Organization and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, may therefore have a bearing
on the use of futures contracts in both jurisdictions in the
future. Each European futures exchange also provides a brief
history of its operations on its respective website, see e.g. a
brief history of Euronext Paris at http://www.matif.fr/
index1.htm; a history of the London Metals Exchange, at
http://www.lme.co.uk/about_lme/docs/lme_history.pdf; a brief
history of LIFFE in “An Introduction to LIFFE” at
http://www.liffe.com/.
9 This paper does not comprehensively address the securities
options markets in the United States for which the Options
Clearing Corporation acts as a central clearer as such markets
for these purposes are treated as securities subject to
regulation under the securities laws by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and not the CFTC.ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 11
2.3 Comparison of the factors influencing the organisation of
derivatives markets in the United States and Europe
The identities of the parties that trade at each
exchange reflect the types of contract traded
on the exchange. Parties in the metals and
energy industries concentrate on their
specialised exchanges. Regional agricultural
exchanges attract producers and distributors
active in the regional agricultural markets.
Exchanges specialising in financial products
attract national investors and, if the contracts
have international use or significance,
international investors. Exchanges that trade
both financial and agricultural products attract
a broad variety of investors. Consequently,
some exchanges have a high degree of
homogeneity in the types of investors trading
at the exchange, while others have a high
degree of heterogeneity in the types of
investors trading at the exchange. Brokers or
other intermediaries may also specialise in the
provision of services related to a particular
type of commodity or contract and may
congregate as market members or users at
the exchanges and associated clearing houses
that specialise in those kinds of products.
Other brokers and intermediaries may offer
services related to commodities or futures
products more generally. Those brokers or
intermediaries may be members of, or offer
services with respect to, multiple kinds of
markets. 
The brief overview below demonstrates
various factors that have influenced the
organisation of futures markets, namely:
• the needs of particular industries and the
desire of traders in those industries to
address price volatility and to trade under
circumstances that maximise the liquidity of
the instruments or products traded;
• the needs of international agricultural
commodities markets;
• the needs of domestic agricultural and
financial markets; and
•t he ability of exchanges to design and list
derivatives contracts and provide trade
execution services for them, irrespective of
the nature of the underlying product or
reference value.
The foregoing overview also reflects that
derivatives exchanges rarely offer duplicate
contracts on their respective markets and that
the trading of particular contracts (and the
liquidity associated with that trading) tends to
concentrate on a single market (or at least on
one market per time zone). Without fungibility
traders may be unwilling to split liquidity
between markets. On the other hand, where
fungibility of contracts exists across exchanges,
as is the case in US markets for options on
equities, the clearing of those markets by a
single clearing house is workable.11
10 For a more detailed history of US futures markets, see, S. Gidel,
“100 Years of Futures Trading: From Domestic Agricultural to
World Financial”, Futures Industry Magazine, December/
January 2000, at http://www.futuresindustry.org/fimagazi-
1929.asp?iss=93&a=607. Each US futures exchange also
provides a brief history of its operations on its website, see e.g.
the “chronological history” of the Chicago Board of Trade at
http://www.cbot.com/cbot/www/page/0,1398,10+13+
87,00.html and the history of innovation at the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange at http://www.cme.com/about_cme/
about_history.cfm.
11 The US markets for equity options were compelled to register
fungible option contracts on single stocks with the US
Department of Justice and the US Securities Exchange
Commission in response to antitrust law (i.e. competition)
concerns.
Board of Trade. While still listing contracts in
these industries, the subsidiary exchanges of
the New York Board of Trade now also offer
a significant number of financial futures
contracts.10Historically, the organisation of the clearing
and settlement of exchange-traded derivatives
mirrored the organisation of the exchanges.
Each exchange operated, or was affiliated to, a
clearing house that cleared contracts only for
that exchange, with the clearing services being
offered as an adjunct of the trade execution
services provided by the exchange.12 From the
perspective of the exchange, the reliability of
the clearing arrangements could also be
viewed as part of the product offered by the
exchange to its customers. As customers will
not invest in contracts where there is
uncertainty as to the integrity of the
transaction, which depends upon the
creditworthiness of the clearing house and the
reliability of the clearing arrangements, an
exchange had an interest in maintaining
control over its clearing arrangements in
order to assure their reliability. Moreover, to
a large extent, the basic risk management
practices and techniques used by derivatives
clearing houses are common across clearing
houses, notwithstanding the underlying
product or reference value on which the
cleared contracts are based. A derivatives
clearing house that trades physical
commodities or other contracts which
envisage an actual delivery of the underlying
upon expiration may be required to organise
specialised delivery arrangements to support
the operation of the contract and may
institute a risk management programme that
reflects the risks unique to that commodity.
Generally, however, it has not been difficult
for derivatives clearing houses to develop the
expertise to clear contracts based on a variety
of products or reference values.13 The
similarity in the risk management techniques
used for various kinds of derivatives contracts
has also facilitated the mergers of derivatives
exchanges and their associated clearing
houses.
Technological advance and developments in
markets and in risk management techniques
have motivated a re-examination of this
historical business model. Historically, for
instance, in order to clear cross-border
transactions at a clearing house, a non-
domestic trader was required to take steps to
extend his operations or business
arrangements to the jurisdiction of the clearing
house by establishing a presence and
maintaining assets there or to retain a local
intermediary through which to clear his
transactions. With the advent of modern
electronic communications technology, a
clearing house can explore ways to bring a
trader to the clearing house electronically,
without their being required to establish a
physical presence in its jurisdiction or,
alternatively, to extend its clearing
arrangements electronically to the jurisdiction
of the trader.
3 The organisation of derivatives
clearing in the United States and
the European Union
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3.1 General aspects of clearing houses
A derivatives clearing house may be a
department within the exchange for which it
clears or an independent legal entity. If
organised as an independent legal entity, the
clearing house is typically owned by the
exchange for which it clears or by its clearing
members. Historically, a derivatives exchange
was typically owned by its members (primarily
brokers, banks, investment companies and
insurance companies). The members were also
generally the exchange’s largest users.
Recently, however, many exchanges have been
de-mutualised and have become profit-
oriented organisations, or are investigating
that possibility. De-mutualisation gives rise to
numerous issues relating to market access,
access to clearing, exchange and clearing
12 While there are no impediments for a clearing house to clear
fungible contracts traded on more than one exchange, there
are some practical impediments to an exchange clearing the
same contract through more than one clearing house. Clearing
through one clearing house allows an exchange’s member to
net debits and credits owing with respect to all contracts traded
on the exchange for purposes of meeting margin requirements.
Clearing through one clearing house also allows traders to close
out their positions without having to return to their original
counterparty.
13 This is especially so because, in most instances, the commodity
underlying the futures contract is not actually delivered upon
expiration of the contract. Rather, the party with a delivery
obligation will offset that obligation by taking an oppositeECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 13
house governance, and potential anti-
competitive or monopolistic behaviour.14 De-
mutualisation also raises the question as to
whether the clearing and settlement functions
associated with on-exchange trading should be
distinguished from the trade execution
function fulfilled by the exchange and whether
clearing and settlement may properly be
undertaken by a profit-oriented enterprise or
are more effectively conducted as a kind of
public utility on a non-profit basis.15
The framework for supervision and oversight
of the derivatives clearing houses varies from
country to country. In most cases, the financial
market regulator plays a leading role in the
supervision of the clearing house, with the
central bank taking an oversight role with
respect to the possible systemic implications
of clearing activities. Banking supervisors may
also have a role through their supervision of
the settlement banks used by the clearing
house. However, the allocation of competence
among banking supervisors, financial market
regulators and central banks regarding clearing
and settlement varies significantly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.16
The clearing of derivatives usually takes place
within a tiered structure. The derivatives
clearing house restricts direct participation in
the clearing process to the most creditworthy
subset of the exchange’s members; these are
those clearing members that have a principal-
to-principal relationship with the clearing
house in its capacity as central counterparty
for all contracts submitted and accepted for
clearing.17 Market participants that are not
clearing members must establish an account
relationship directly or through another party
(a non-clearing broker) with a clearing
member to effect settlement. Generally, there
is no contractual relationship between the
derivatives clearing house and these non-
clearing member market participants
(irrespective of whether they are non-clearing
member brokers or end-users). The
development of electronic technology makes it
easier for an end-user to become a clearing
member, assuming that it can meet the capital
and other financial requirements. If an investor
clears directly with the clearing house,
however, either the investor or the clearing
house may lose the benefit of ancillary services
historically provided by the clearing
intermediary (e.g. investment advice, back
office record-keeping or risk management
support).
A clearing member is generally required by law
to maintain two separate accounts at the
clearing house: one to hold its own assets and
positions and another to hold its customers’
assets, collateral and positions. In some
jurisdictions, a clearing member is required to
maintain all of its customers’ assets, collateral
and positions in a single omnibus clearing
account. This requirement helps protect the
clearing house against loss, in that all assets in
the customer omnibus account are available to
pay amounts owing with respect to positions
held through the omnibus account. The
consequence of this requirement is that a
customer of a derivatives broker is subject to
loss if another customer of his broker defaults
and the broker does not have adequate capital
position in the market. The result is that the parties to futures
contracts generally exchange the cash flows representing the
changes in value of the underlying commodity and the
associated contract, rather than making a delivery of the
underlying commodity in exchange for a cash payment. This
greatly simplifies a derivatives clearing house’s operations as it
primarily handles exchanges of cash between the parties.
However, the petroleum markets present an exception to this
practice as petroleum traders often use the futures markets to
take delivery of the petroleum covered by the futures contract.
14 For further details, see IOSCO Technical Committee, “Issues
Paper on Exchange Demutualization,” (June 2001) at
http://www.iosco.org/iosco.html and CFTC Commissioner
Thomas J. Erickson, “Going for the Gold: Futures Exchanges
Begin to Demutualize,” 20 Futures and Derivatives Law
Report 1 (September 2000), available at http://openinterest/
comm/erickson/fdlrdmtl.pdf.
15 The development of electronic trade execution technology has
influenced the dynamic associated with the creation of new
risk-management products. Historically, futures exchanges
themselves were the principal architects of new futures
products. However, new electronic trading technologies permit
groups of market participants themselves to consider
mechanisms and contracts to organise both the cash markets
in a commodity (e.g., electricity) and the risk management
contracts (e.g. futures) associated with those cash markets.
Those new niche markets and their participants may seek out
expertise in clearing from clearing houses, rather than expertise
in contract design and trade execution from an exchange.
16 For further details, see Section 6.3 regarding a “Regulatory
consequences of the US and EU regulatory schemes for
financial services with respect to clearing”.
17 Of course, a financially qualified member or other market
participant may choose not to become a clearing member for
its own business reasons.to cover the loss. Upon a default with respect
to a position held in the broker’s omnibus
account, the clearing house will sweep the
omnibus account to cover the loss on the
position in that account. In such event, the
assets of one customer held in that account
may be used to defray the obligations owing
by the defaulting customer. While the broker
is obligated vis-à-vis its non-defaulting
customers to reimburse them for any assets
that are swept out of the omnibus account by
the clearing house, this obligation of the
broker is meaningless if the broker does not
have sufficient assets to reimburse all
customers. Moreover, the guarantee provided
by the clearing house as a central counterparty
does not protect such non-defaulting
customers against loss. Rather, the central
counterparty guarantee protects the clearing
house itself and its ability to permit
anonymous contracting and offsetting of
positions; this protects customers of other
brokers on the other side of the market.18
However, a clearing house cannot use assets
held in the customer omnibus account to
defray obligations owing with respect to
positions held in the broker’s proprietary
account. Therefore, while a broker’s customer
is exposed to a potential loss of its collateral
with respect to a default by its broker’s other
customers, it is not subject to such a loss as a
result of its broker’s default with respect to its
proprietary trading. This treatment of
customer funds is generally deemed to be
necessary to protect the clearing house and
the public markets. Some jurisdictions,
however, permit a clearing member to
establish a separate account for each client at
the clearing house. In such cases (assuming
that all customer funds are properly handled),
a client’s assets cannot be used to defray the
obligations of the broker or its other
customers. This treatment of customer funds
extends the maximum level of protection to
customers.
Brokers are generally also required by law or
regulation to maintain records and books of
account to identify all of their customers’
assets and positions on a gross basis on their
own books. The clearing members are free to
set their own requirements vis-à-vis their
customers regarding the conditions under
which they are willing to carry and clear
positions on behalf of the customer in
question. The clearing members may set credit
limits or collateral requirements more severe
than those set by the clearing house or the
exchange. Minimum safeguards that clearing
members must use with their clients (i.e.
minimum margin levels and the type of
collateral that may be accepted) are
sometimes specified by the clearing house or
the exchange.
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3.2 Sources of risk and risk management procedures of
clearing houses
As a central counterparty to its clearing
members, a derivatives clearing house assumes
a variety of risks which must be managed.
More specifically, the clearing house must have
adequate risk management measures in place
to cover (i) the default of a clearing member,
(ii) the default of a settlement bank and (iii) a
number of other risks.
3.2.1 Defaults of clearing members
The defaults of clearing members on their
outstanding contracts may expose the clearing
house to principal (delivery) risk, replacement
cost risk and liquidity risk.
Principal risk can occur if contracts are settled
through delivery of the underlying commodity
or instrument. For example, if a commodity or
underlying instrument is delivered prior to
receipt of payment, the deliverer risks losing
its full value. If payment is made prior to
delivery, the payer risks losing the full value of
18 Some clearing houses may maintain a trust fund that can be
used on a discretionary basis to reimburse customers whose
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the payment. Such principal risk does not exist
if the product traded by the derivatives
exchange calls for cash settlement rather than
delivery. Otherwise, a delivery-versus-payment
(DvP) mechanism can be used to eliminate
principal risk.19
The clearing house faces replacement cost risk if
a member defaults. In such a case, the clearing
house has an obligation to the clearing
member on the other side of the contract, so
that it must take a position identical to that on
which the clearing member has defaulted.
However, as time passes after the default,
market prices will tend to move away from
the level that existed at the time the defaulting
clearing member last posted margin to cover
its obligations under the contract. As a result,
the obligations of the clearing house may
fluctuate from the time of the default until the
clearing house covers and closes out the
position.
The clearing house may also be exposed to
liquidity risk since it must fulfil its payment
obligations without delay even if one or more
members default or their performance of their
settlement obligations is delayed. This is
particularly critical because, owing to the
central counterparty’s central position, any
doubts about its ability to conclude settlement
may create systemic disturbances.
In order to protect themselves against the
risks emerging from a clearing member’s
default, clearing houses typically apply a range
of  risk management procedures. In particular,
every clearing member must post an initial
amount with the clearing house as margin
(initial margin) upon the creation of a position.
The margin necessary to secure each position
is then recalculated at least once a day and, at
many exchanges, more often per day, with any
additionally required margin (maintenance
margin) having to be paid accordingly.20 The
kinds of assets that may be posted as initial
and maintenance margin are specified by the
clearing house and generally include cash,
government securities and bank guarantees or
letters of credit. More and more often,
clearing houses are also accepting shares in
money market mutual funds and listed equities
as initial margin. Variation margin is typically
paid in cash.
A clearing member is in default when it fails on
time to meet an obligation to post variation
margin to secure an on going position or to
make delivery of, or make payment for, the
commodity underlying the derivative contract
upon its expiration. Consequently, a liquidity
or solvency problem is most likely to arise
when the derivatives contract becomes subject
to extremely adverse price variations.
In becoming a central counterparty to every
trade, the derivatives clearing house must have
the means to cover the default of any clearing
member. The following measures are taken to
limit this risk:
• the imposition of membership
requirements, including capital requirements,
and an ongoing monitoring of compliance
with such requirements in order to limit
the likelihood of defaults;
• the imposition of security deposit, collateral
requirements and exposure ceilings to limit
19 Delivery versus payment (DvP) describes a link between
securities or commodity transfers, on the one hand, and fund
transfers, on the other, which ensures that delivery occurs if,
and only if, payment occurs.
20 In the United States, the margin for a futures transaction is
generally categorised as a performance bond. A futures margin
is not considered a partial payment against a purchased asset,
as is the case when an equity security is acquired on margin,
but as a guarantee for the central counterparty of the
completion of settlement upon contract expiration. However,
the credit risk associated with a position may not be totally
eliminated by the posting of a margin. To the extent that a
clearing member posts a letter of credit as a margin or the
clearing member borrows the funds or securities to post as a
margin, the credit risk associated with the clearing member’s
positions is shifted into the banking system or the credit
markets. This technique of shifting credit risk is also utilised by
central securities depositories (CSDs) in the settlement of
securities transactions. The creation of a central counterparty
for securities settlements that guarantees the performance of
the buyer’s and seller’s settlement obligations is another
mechanism to shift credit risk away from a CSD. Central
counterparties for securities also use the techniques used by
derivatives clearing houses to shift credit risk to the banking
system and the credit and securities lending markets. Shifting
credit risk in this way, away from central counterparty clearing
houses and CSDs, works towards protecting the public markets
for derivatives and securities. For further details, see
CPSS/IOSCO,  Recommendations for Securities Settlement
Systems (November 2001) at www.bis.org.the potential losses and liquidity pressures
that arise upon default;21 and
• the maintenance of additional clearing house
resources, including – in some cases – the
right to make assessments against clearing
members.
None of these measures are claimed to be
foolproof on their own, but weaknesses in one
type of safeguard may be compensated for by
strengths in other safeguards.
3.2.2 Settlement bank failures
If clearing houses effect money settlements
through private settlement banks, they are
exposed to the risk of settlement bank failure.
Such failures could expose a clearing house to
both credit risk and liquidity risk.
In the United States, a derivatives clearing
house effects money settlements and
settlements in US government bonds posted
as margin through accounts it maintains at one
or more private settlement banks. Only
specified types of depository institutions are
allowed to maintain a deposit account with a
US Federal Reserve Bank, as is necessary to
have access to central bank money. Moreover,
generally US government bonds can only be
held through a depository institution that
participates in the Federal Reserve System’s
Fedwire system.22 US government bonds can
only be held by, or in an account with, such a
depository institution. Many of the clearing
members of US derivatives clearing houses are
not depository institutions with access to
central bank money or to the Fedwire system.
Consequently, the clearing house and the
clearing members establish accounts at
designated private settlement banks that have
direct access to central bank money and the
Fedwire system and through which they effect
money and government bond settlements. US
derivatives clearing houses protect themselves
against the risk of loss arising out of a
settlement bank failure by selecting only the
most well-capitalised banks to serve as
settlement banks and by spreading the risk of
loss by using more than one settlement bank.
Another technique to minimise the risk of
settlement bank failure is to convert customer
cash held in deposits at the settlement bank
into securities, e.g. Treasury bonds, held by
the settlement bank. While a cash deposit
account creates a debtor/creditor relationship
between the bank and its customer for the
amount on deposit and a customer claim
against the assets of the bank in the event of
its insolvency, customer securities held by a
settlement bank are segregated for the benefit
of the customer on its books, are not included
in its assets upon its insolvency and can be
recovered by the customer free of any claims
against the bank.
In Europe, derivatives clearing houses may
effect money settlements in central bank
money or through one or more private
settlement banks.23 Whether a derivative
clearing house opens its cash settlement
account with a central bank or with a private
bank depends on a number of factors, such as
access of clearing members to central bank
accounts, access to intraday credit and the
terms upon which credit may be provided, or
the time at which finality can be achieved for
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21 In order to have sufficient assets to discharge its obligations, a
clearing house generally maintains one or more reserve,
guarantee or indemnity fund(s), usually composed of funds
deposited by the clearing members, its own retained earnings
and internal capital as well as insurance against losses arising
from a clearing member’s default. The order in which these
various sources of funds are applied to cover amounts owed by
a defaulting member is set out in the clearing house’s internal
rules. To address potential liquidity needs, a clearing house also
typically maintains a stand-by line of credit facility with a
commercial bank.
22 Individual investors who intend to hold US Treasury securities
to maturity often hold the securities through the
US Treasury’s “Treasury Direct” programme. See
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/.
23 For further details, see Section 3.3 below. The relative merits of
settling in central bank money versus commercial bank money
are the subject of an ongoing debate among central banks and
securities regulators. Both types of settlement asset have
advantages and disadvantages in a given context. The use of
central bank money as a settlement asset is generally viewed to
involve less risk than settlement in commercial bank money
because there is virtually no risk that a central bank will fail.
However, there are some practical impediments to the effective
use of central bank money in some contexts. Consequently, in
the CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement
Systems, settlement in either type of asset is currently deemed
acceptable. Whatever type of asset is used to effect settlement,
it is critical that the clearing house consider and effectively
manage the risks and practical impediments associated with
the kind of asset used to effect settlement.ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 17
payments. If a private settlement bank is used
and the settlement bank fails before the
clearing house has received payments for its
credit positions, but after making payments for
its debit positions, the clearing house may
suffer losses significantly higher than those
arising from the default of a clearing member.
Furthermore, the obligations of a private
settlement bank with respect to monies and
securities deposited with the bank are not
collateralised, as is the case with clearing
members’ obligations. Legal agreements
governing the use of the settlement bank
account, the right to net obligations between
settlement banks and any guarantees with
respect to the obligations of the failed
settlement bank by other settlement banks will
also be of vital importance in these
circumstances.
As a matter of public policy, however, once a
market participant has initiated a payment
instruction to its settlement bank to transmit
the settlement payment to the clearing house
and once the market participant’s settlement
bank has confirmed to the clearing house that
a settlement payment will be made, the
insolvency of the settlement bank should not
result in a reversal of the settlement
instruction, and the settlement payment
should be completed as if the bankruptcy had
not occurred. A contrary policy would be
likely to have catastrophic implications for the
clearing house and public markets in general.
Such a policy does, however, favour the
clearing house and the public markets over the
unsecured and uninsured creditors of the
settlement bank.
Another mechanism to attenuate the risk of
loss upon the failure of a settlement bank
would be for the clearing house to obtain
intraday credit from its settlement banks, so
that debits and credits to its accounts can be
posted simultaneously. This would reduce the
clearing’s house exposure to the net amount
collected (if any) and not to the sum total of
its credit positions. If netting is not used, it is
important to reduce the time period between
the irrevocable transfer of funds to members
that hold a credit position and the receipt of
payments. By contrast, there is no risk of
settlement bank failure if settlement is made in
central bank money and the central bank
payment system is a real-time gross settlement
(RTGS) system.
3.2.3 Other risks to which the derivatives
clearing houses may be exposed
In addition to defaults by clearing members
and settlement bank failures, clearing houses
can be exposed to a number of other risks.
While the clearing house typically does not
assume market risk in its capacity as a central
counterparty, given that there is a
corresponding short position for every long
position it holds, and vice versa, the clearing
house is exposed to market risk with regard
to the investment of its own funds. However,
these market risks are negligible for clearing
houses, since these funds are usually held in
highly liquid, short-term government securities
or bank deposits. Furthermore, a clearing
house may be subject to market risk if it
accepts securities as margin. Clearing houses
usually address this market risk by discounting
the value of non-domestic currencies and
securities posted as margin (i.e. by subjecting
them to “haircuts”) and by marking them to
market daily.24
Currency exchange risks are present if the
clearing house accepts non-domestic currency
as margin or if it clears contracts that are
denominated and settled in a non-domestic
currency, but that are collateralised with
domestic currency or assets denominated in
domestic currency. Clearing houses usually
address this risk by subjecting non-domestic
currency and assets denominated in non-
24 While clearing houses are not generally directly subject to
market risks, there is a relationship – to the extent that their
customers assume market risk – between the customers’
market risk and the potential future credit exposure to which
the clearing house is subject. Changes in market price which
cause customers to incur losses on their positions result in an
increase in the credit risks undertaken by the clearing house
unless the clearing house has adequate collateral to cover the
loss or until the customer meets a margin call and provides
additional margin collateral.domestic currency to haircuts and by marking
all assets to market daily.25
Operational risks are of great significance to
clearing houses and it is vital that they be
managed appropriately. Fulfilment of its role as
a central counterparty requires a derivatives
clearing house to monitor its credit exposure
on a real-time basis and also to ensure that
collateral can be accessed at any moment, if
necessary. Back-up procedures and facilities
are also maintained to assure this ability.
Derivatives clearing houses are potentially also
subject to a wide variety of legal risks. The
enforceability of netting arrangements, the
ability to realise a defaulting member’s assets,
the finality of payments and securities
transfers, the enforceability of the clearing
house’s internal rules and the general legal
framework applicable in the jurisdiction in
which the clearing house operates must be
subject to a high degree of legal certainty. The
European Union has addressed these risks to a
significant extent through its Settlement
Finality Directive.26 The United States has
addressed these risks through its laws on
federal securities, futures, banking and
bankruptcy. While some issues remain
unresolved in each jurisdiction, both the
European Union and the United States have a
highly developed legal framework to support
the operation of derivatives clearing houses.
However, clearing houses in both the
European Union and the United States may be
forced to address issues relating to conflicts of
law when operating on a cross-border basis or
through links with non-domestic clearing
houses.
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3.3 A comparison of the organisation of clearing in the
United States and in Europe
With regard to legal forms and ownership
structures, a comparison of the largest
derivatives clearing houses in the United States
and the European Union yields a rather
diversified picture.27 In the United States,
trading on each derivatives exchange, with
some exceptions, is cleared and settled
through an affiliated clearing house. The
clearing house may be a division of the
exchange or may be a separate legal entity.
For example, Chicago Mercantile Exchange Inc.
(CME) was de-mutualised and transformed
itself from a non-profit, membership-owned
organisation to a profit-oriented, shareholder-
owned corporation. The CME’s clearing house
operates as a division of the exchange. The
Board of Trade Clearing Corporation
(BOTCC) is a business corporation and is
owned by member clearing firms that trade on
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and the
MidAmerica Commodity Exchange. The New
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) is a
business corporation owned by its members,
and its clearing house operates as a division of
the exchange
In Europe, historically, each derivatives
exchange also cleared and settled through an
affiliated clearing house, but European Union
(EU) clearing houses have different legal forms
and ownership structures. Clearnet is a credit
institution under French law and a subsidiary
of Euronext Paris. Eurex Clearing is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Eurex exchange. The
London Clearing House (LCH), by contrast, is
structured as a private limited company, is
owned by its members and is run on a non-
profit basis. Moreover, clearing for derivatives
exchanges in the European Union has recently
undergone a certain degree of consolidation.
Clearnet, Eurex Clearing, and LCH now clear
multiple products, including exchange-traded
futures and options, equities, cash market debt
instruments, repurchase agreements and OTC
derivatives products (collectively referred to
25 See also Section 6.2 focusing on the increasing importance of
clearing arrangements between clearing houses at a cross-
border level which implies risks and presents particular
challenges to central banks and regulators.
26 Directive 98/26 on settlement finality in payment and securities
settlement systems. Official Journal L 166, 11/06/1998, pp.
45–50. For further details, see Section 3.2.
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as “financial instruments”). In addition,
Clearnet and Eurex Clearing have extended
their services across jurisdictions as part of a
merger or reorganisation of the operations of
their associated exchanges.
Probably the most striking difference between
US and EU clearing houses is to be found in
the scope of their business. In fact, the clearing
houses in the United States tend to be more
specialised, while EU clearing houses offer
cross-product clearing. Indeed, Clearnet,
Eurex Clearing, and LCH offer services for
a very broad range of financial products
covering stock exchange transactions, bonds,
repurchase agreements, financial and
exchange-traded commodity futures and
options, equity and index options and OTC
securities trades. By contrast, the CME
clearing house, the BOTCC and the clearing
house of NYMEX act as central counterparties
principally for the products traded at
their respective exchanges. This difference
has resulted from different consolidation
processes in the financial market infrastructure
in the United States and in the European
Union.28
With regard to settlement procedures, there
is tendency in the European Union for clearing
houses to settle cash transactions in central
bank money. This holds true of both Clearnet
and Eurex Clearing regarding settlement in
euro. Non-euro transactions may be settled in
commercial bank money. On the other hand,
LCH settles in commercial bank money. The
situation is very different in the United States,
where a tiered structure for cash settlement is
predominant. CME, BOTCC and NYMEX all
settle their cash transactions via accounts at
one of several commercial banks.
As far as risk management procedures are
concerned, all clearing houses in both the
European Union and the United States apply
similar techniques.29 Differences between
individual clearing houses exist, but there is no
indication of fundamental differences in the
general approaches to conducting risk
management in the United States and the
European Union. In fact, all clearing houses use
safeguards designed to minimise the
probability of a failure of a market participant.
In particular, financial and operational
requirements for membership of the clearing
house fulfil this purpose. All clearing houses
also use safeguards designed to minimise their
losses if a market participant should fail. This
category relates to margin requirements that
collateralise the current and potential future
credit exposures stemming from the trades of
a participant. Margin has to be paid in cash or
high-quality bonds by the participant itself.
Another possibility for minimising losses is to
limit the build-up of such exposures by
periodically settling positions, especially in the
derivatives markets, or by making margin calls.
In very volatile markets, sophisticated systems
calculate, if necessary during the day,
additional margin requirements that have to be
provided immediately. All clearing houses also
use safeguards designed to cover losses that
exceed the value of the defaulting member’s
margin collateral. For this purpose, clearing
houses maintain supplementary resources such
as capital, pre-funded guarantee funds, asset
pools, guarantees and insurance schemes.
28 The differences in the main operational features of the major
central counterparty clearing houses for derivatives in the
United States and in the European Union will be discussed in
greater detail in Section 5.
29 See Annexes 5 and 7 for further details.Responding to the increase in cross-border
trades, clearing houses have developed, and
are in the process of developing, innovative
practices to clear and to collateralise
derivatives transactions on a global basis.
Operational innovations that reflect the
internationalisation of risk management
practices and clearing arrangements include:
• the acceptance of collateral in the form of
non-domestic currencies or securities of
non-domestic issuers at a local bank or
intermediary;
• the settlement of obligations by payments
or delivery of securities to a bank or
intermediary in a non-domestic jurisdiction
or in multiple jurisdictions;
•t he execution of clearing trades at
an exchange in one jurisdiction through
a clearing house located in another
jurisdiction;
•m utual offsetting arrangements between a
domestic and a non-domestic clearing
house; and
• cross-margining arrangements between a
domestic and a non-domestic clearing house.
Operational innovations can involve a single
clearing house changing its own operational
procedures to facilitate cross-border clearing
or two clearing houses harmonising their
operational procedures to enhance the
interoperability of their respective systems.
4 Operational developments in
international risk management
practices/arrangements
ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 20
4.1 Acceptance of non-domestic currency or non-domestic securities
Historically, clearing houses generally accepted
as collateral only domestic currency or
securities posted through a local, domestic
clearing member in the jurisdiction of that
clearing house. These requirements were
prompted by technological limitations on the
ability of the clearing house to deal with assets
held at a distance and the need to eliminate
both foreign exchange risk and any legal risk
related to the potential failure of a non-
domestic market participant. Modern
communications technology facilitates transfers
of funds and assets denominated in non-
domestic currency or securities, irrespective
of whether they are held domestically or on a
cross-border basis. As a consequence, market
participants have put some pressure on
clearing houses to accept non-domestic
currencies and securities as collateral.
Acceptance of non-domestic currencies or
securities of non-domestic issuers as collateral
may decrease the non-domestic trader’s costs
of depositing margin at a clearing house. If
non-domestic funds or assets are accepted,
the trader saves the costs associated with
exchanging or converting them into domestic
funds or assets.
However, accepting non-domestic currencies
or securities of non-domestic issuers as margin
exposes the clearing house to several risks
that are not given when margin is accepted
only in domestic currency or securities. Most
obviously, the clearing house is exposed to
foreign exchange risk (unless the contract is
settled in the same non-domestic currency).
Normally, a clearing house protects itself
against this foreign exchange risk by super-
collateralising the positions (through the
haircuts applied to the non-domestic assets)
or by hedging its foreign exchange risk in the
market. In addition, if margin is held in the
form of securities of non-domestic issuers, the
clearing house takes risks associated with the
holding system through which the non-
domestic securities are held.30
If a clearing house accepts non-domestic
currencies or securities as margin, it will need
30 Because most securities are immobilised or dematerialised and
transferred by book entry internationally, unless the clearing
house is a direct participant in the central securities depository
(CSD) of the jurisdiction in which the securities have been
issued, the clearing house must maintain the securities through
accounts at one or more intermediaries. As a consequence, the
clearing house may be at a risk of loss if one of these
intermediaries becomes insolvent. Regulators may also impose
limitations on the extent of the margin that can be
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to protect itself against legal uncertainties
associated with admitting non-domestic
clearing members and/or holding margin in a
non-domestic jurisdiction. One way of
addressing these risks is for the clearing house
to hold the non-domestic funds or assets in
accounts at settlement banks or other
intermediaries within its own jurisdiction. This
type of arrangement, however, may not
eliminate all legal issues relating to the
participation of remote clearing members in
the clearing house. Even where the assets
posted as margin by that remote clearing
member are held in accounts at domestic
settlement banks or other intermediaries, the
clearing house remains subject to some legal
risk of that remote clearing member failing and
a bankruptcy court in the jurisdiction of the
remote clearing member asserting jurisdiction
over the assets posted domestically with the
clearing house and entering an order regarding
the disposition of those assets which is
inconsistent with the rules of the clearing
house and the laws of the clearing house’s
jurisdiction. However, from a policy
perspective, the courts of all jurisdictions, but
particularly the courts of the clearing house’s
jurisdiction, should take a contrary view. If a
clearing house holds margin or collateral
through accounts at settlement banks or other
intermediaries located in the jurisdiction of the
clearing house, then the rules of the clearing
house and the domestic law of the clearing
house’s jurisdiction should govern the
disposition of those assets, superseding, or
taking priority over, any laws of the non-
domestic jurisdiction. The public interest in
assuring the viability of the risk management
procedures of the clearing house and the
integrity of the clearing house’s operations
clearly justifies and necessitates such a result.
Some clearing houses facilitate their non-
domestic traders’ operations by providing a
foreign exchange service. In these
arrangements, the clearing house opens
accounts with financial intermediaries in other
jurisdictions in which a large number of its
traders operate. The clearing house then
accepts as margin the deposit of non-domestic
currency or securities in its accounts at the
non-domestic intermediaries. It can then
transfer the non-domestic currency to a non-
domestic currency account in its own
jurisdiction or can execute an exchange
transaction to convert the assets into its
domestic currency and transfer the converted
funds to a domestic currency account at a
bank located in its own jurisdiction. The
clearing house charges traders a fee to cover
the costs of the foreign exchange service.31
Under any of the foregoing techniques, the
clearing house is generally assured that, while
the funds or assets initially posted as margin
are not domestic, they will be held in the
jurisdiction of the clearing house, will be
subject to legal process there and would be
treated, in the event of the insolvency of a
market participant, in accordance with the
bankruptcy laws and rules of the clearing
house’s jurisdiction. In addition, if funds or
securities are held domestically, the clearing
house, domestic derivatives regulators and the
domestic central bank also are in a better
position to monitor the financial capacity of
any settlement banks or other intermediaries
through which the margin assets are held.
4.2 Acceptance of margin at a non-domestic bank or other
intermediary
Because of the risks associated with holding
margin outside the jurisdiction of the clearing
house, most clearing houses require that
margin (or a substantial portion thereof) be
maintained in the jurisdiction of the clearing
house. However, this requirement may create
certain operational complexities for market
31 Clearing houses also may establish an account at a non-
domestic financial institution through which its domestic
members may make deliveries under a contract denominated
in a non-domestic currency or based on a non-domestic asset.
In such circumstances, the clearing house may also organise an
exchange service for its domestic members to convert domestic
currency or assets into non-domestic currency or assets for
transfer to such a non-domestic account so as to effect
deliveries under the cleared contract.participants. These operational complexities
may be simplified for the trader if the clearing
house maintains accounts at banks or other
intermediaries in the jurisdiction in which the
trader is located (or otherwise maintains
assets) and the clearing house accepts the
delivery of funds or securities as margin by
credits to such accounts. Such arrangements
may also facilitate the trading of remote
participants at the exchanges cleared by the
clearing house. The remote participants can
execute trades on an exchange in one
jurisdiction, but collateralise those trades by
depositing funds or securities in accounts
maintained by the clearing house with
intermediaries in its own jurisdiction.
However, accepting margin in a non-domestic
jurisdiction may also exacerbate the risks to
which the clearing house is subject. In
particular, the clearing house is exposed to the
risk that the assets will become subject to
legal process in the jurisdiction in which the
account is maintained and that the courts in
that jurisdiction will order disposition of the
assets in a manner not anticipated by the
clearing house and in a manner other than that
specified in the rules of the clearing house.
Such a result would obviously disrupt the
assumptions implicit in the clearing house’s
risk management procedures. Given that risk,
clearing houses exercise extraordinary care
when designing and negotiating such
arrangements and verify that they are
enforceable under the legal framework in the
relevant jurisdictions by obtaining supporting
legal opinions. However, a legal opinion is not
a guarantee and does not obviate the risks
of accepting margin in a non-domestic
jurisdiction.
The European Union has taken steps to
facilitate cross-border clearing arrangements
within the Community through the provisions
of the Investment Services Directive (ISD)32
and the Settlement Finality Directive (SFD)33.
The ISD facilitates the right of banks and
investment firms authorised in an EU Member
State, under specified conditions, to provide
trade execution services in other Member
States in which an electronic regulated market
is authorised through remote access to the
market (i.e. through electronic access which
does not require the physical presence of the
authorised firm in the jurisdiction of the
market). The ISD also facilitates the right of
such an authorised firm to have access to the
clearing house of the regulated market.34 The
SFD harmonises the laws of the Member
States regarding the netting of obligations in
designated securities settlement systems.35 It
also harmonises the finality of transfer orders
entered to settle obligations in those
settlement systems, and the treatment in the
case of bankruptcy of assets posted as margin
to secure obligations owing to those
settlement systems.36
Consequently, it is now possible to regard the
European Union as having an integrated legal
environment for payment and securities
settlement systems.37 Cross-border clearing
arrangements within the Community, such as a
clearing house’s acceptance of assets by
credits to accounts with banks or other
intermediaries in other EU Member States,
take place within this integrated environment
and obviate the risks associated with the
acceptance of collateral in a non-domestic
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32 Directive 93/22 on investment services in the securities field.
Official Journal L 141, 11/06/1993, pp. 27– 46.
33 See footnote 27.
34 However, under the ISD, the clearing house has the option to
provide only indirect access to the clearing house if providing
direct access may compromise its right to dispose of margin. As
noted above, clearing houses generally require non-domestic
traders to clear though a local, domestic clearing member to
assure that the assets posted as margin at the clearing house
are present in the jurisdiction of the clearing house and to
assure the clearing house that the assets will be treated in a
manner consistent with the rules of the clearing house and the
laws and rules of the clearing house’s jurisdiction.
35 All clearing houses for regulated derivatives markets within the
Community have been designated as securities settlement
systems under the directive.
36 Through the SFD, the rules or regulations under which
obligations to the clearing house are netted are legally
sanctioned and rendered enforceable. Instructions entered to
settle obligations owing to the clearing house are rendered final
and irreversible from the moment they are entered at the
clearing house, notwithstanding the ordinary operation of any
national insolvency law rules. Moreover, the availability of the
margin posted to discharge obligations owing to the clearing
house is assured, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the party
posting the assets or of the intermediary through whom the
assets are posted.
37 The legal environment regarding the taking of collateral to
secure uncleared, bilateral transactions in the OTC market
outside the operation of a designated securities settlement
system will only be fully integrated upon adoption of the
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jurisdiction. As long as assets held by a
designated securities settlement system,
including a derivatives clearing house, are
posted in accordance with the rules of the
system, they must be treated as provided for
in the SFD, irrespective of the Member State
in which they are posted. In this manner, the
ISD and the SFD facilitate both remote
membership in a clearing house by clearing
members from other Member States and
cross-border clearing arrangements within the
Community organised by the clearing house.
German and Swiss authorities also have taken
actions to achieve similar results with respect
to the operations of the Eurex exchanges.
Trading on Eurex Deutschland and Eurex
Zürich takes place through a common
platform pursuant to common internal rules.
Eurex trades are cleared through Eurex
Clearing, a German corporation located in
Frankfurt. Eurex Clearing accepts specified
securities as margin in accounts in both
Germany and Switzerland. It also accepts the
deposit of Swiss francs to its account at the
National Bank of Switzerland, while accepting
euro, and other specified currencies, at
accounts at Clearstream Bank in Germany.
Regulatory actions of the German and Swiss
authorities support this cross-border
organisation of the operations of Eurex
Clearing.
Several clearing houses in the United States
and Europe currently engage in this practice at
an international level and accept specified
types of margin collateral, generally specific
non-domestic currencies and securities of non-
domestic issuers, in non-domestic accounts
maintained by the clearing house at non-
domestic intermediaries. These clearing
houses may be exposed to some risk of the
margin assets posted in this manner being
treated in a manner inconsistent with the rules
of the clearing house and the laws of their
domestic jurisdiction in the event of the
insolvency of the clearing member that has
posted the assets. For this reason, the clearing
house may limit the amount of margin posted
in non-domestic accounts to a specified
proportion of the required aggregate margin.
4.3 Clearing in another jurisdiction
In certain arrangements, trades that are
executed on an exchange in one jurisdiction
are cleared through a clearing house located in
another jurisdiction. In these arrangements,
the trades are cleared and the positions are
held in accordance with the rules of the local
clearing house and the laws of the jurisdiction
in which it is located.
The clearing for Euronext Brussels is an
example of this kind of arrangement.38
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and
the Spanish MEFF Renta Variable Exchange
recently concluded an arrangement through
which certain contracts executed on MEFF will
be cleared through the CME’s clearing house
in Chicago. Trades involving those contracts
executed at the MEFF will be carried as
positions at the CME’s clearing house pursuant
to the CME’s normal clearing procedures.
Moreover, for the purpose of paying and
receiving margin in connection with the
clearing of the contracts, CME and MEFF have
established separate accounts at banks located
in the European Union (in the United Kingdom
or Spain) and authorised to effect transfers
38 Euronext Brussels, Euronext Amsterdam and Euronext Paris are
part of Euronext N.V, a Dutch corporation. Trades on Euronext
Brussels are cleared through Clearnet SA, a French bank which
maintains branches in Belgium and Amsterdam. Margin in the
form of euros may be deposited directly into Clearnet’s account
at the Banque de France through the TARGET system. Margins
in the form of cash other than euro may be deposited in a
Clearnet account at one of Clearnet’s private settlement banks.
Securities deposited as margins to secure positions at Euronext
Brussels are deposited in Clearnet’s account at Euroclear
France, the French CSD. The arrangements for Euronext
Brussels stand in contrast to the arrangements for Euronext
Amsterdam. Clearnet also clears trades at Euronext
Amsterdam. However, margin securing positions on Euronext
Amsterdam, irrespective of whether in the form of securities or
cash, are currently held in Clearnet’s accounts at De
Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch central bank.between the accounts.39 Otherwise, the
clearing is treated and handled as a domestic
US operation.40 Because MEFF has become a
special clearing member of the CME through
which its members’ positions are held, MEFF
has personal liability for the obligations of its
clearing members to the CME’s clearing house.
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4.4 Mutual offsetting arrangements
Mutual offsetting between derivatives clearing
houses is another operational method by
which clearing houses meet the demands of
their clearing members to facilitate cross-
border trading of derivatives contracts. Mutual
offsetting systems are generally designed to
facilitate trading in designated fungible
contracts (MOS contracts) that are traded on
exchanges operating in different time zones.
Through the mutual offsetting system, a trade
in an MOS contract executed at one exchange
(domestic exchange) can be offset by taking an
opposite position at the exchange operating in
the other time zone (non-domestic exchange).
In this manner, the participating exchanges can
extend the hours that a trader can trade in
the designated MOS contracts. The extended
trading hours permit a trader to take or
offsetting positions at the non-domestic
exchange even when its local, domestic
exchange is closed.
In a mutual offsetting system, the initial MOS
contract trade is cleared and held through the
clearing house of the exchange at which the
trade was executed (domestic clearing house)
and the trader posts margin through its
clearing member according to the normal
procedures of that (domestic) clearing house.
If the trader later wishes to offset that
position at a time when the initial exchange is
closed, it can arrange to have a trade for an
opposite position executed at the non-
domestic exchange. That trade is then
registered with the non-domestic exchange’s
clearing house (non-domestic clearing house).
The obligation of the trader vis-à-vis the non-
domestic clearing house is transferred to the
domestic clearing house either directly or
indirectly through entries in the accounts of its
clearing member(s). When the obligation
related to the second, offsetting trade is finally,
legally transferred to the domestic clearing
house, it is simultaneously legally discharged at
the non-domestic clearing house, thereby
legally and finally offsetting the original trade
carried at the domestic exchange.41
From a collateral management perspective, a
mutual offsetting system requires that a trader
have sufficient margin or collateral at each
clearing house to support the positions that
will ultimately be offset. A review of the
treatment of the margin supporting each
position as it is processed through the system
demonstrates this point. When the trader
initially takes a position in a designated MOS
contract at the domestic exchange, it must
post margin at the domestic clearing house,
39 Two futures clearing houses in the United States are using a
similar technique to facilitate the use of collateral domestically
on an experimental basis. Pursuant to this pilot programme,
each clearing house has opened an account with the same
settlement bank. Market participants that are members of, and
maintain funds at, both clearing houses can settle their margin
requirements by a transfer of available funds or US government
securities via book entries to the accounts of the clearing
houses at that settlement bank. Moreover, those transfers can
be completed with immediate intraday finality. In this way, the
clearing member can collateralise positions at two clearing
houses using the same collateral pool (maintained in the two
accounts of the clearing houses at the one settlement bank).
However, this kind of arrangement restricts the kind of asset
that can be posted as margins to funds and securities that may
be held in accounts at the settlement bank.
40 The Commodity Futures Trading Commission has granted relief
to US futures commission merchants, which execute
transactions in the specified contracts on the MEFF regarding
the segregation of customer funds, posted as margins at the
CME to collateralise the positions created. Amounts deposited
as margins by customers in a US futures commission merchant
may be segregated as if the MEFF position were a US domestic
futures transaction. This provides greater protection to those
customers than if the funds were treated as funds deposited in
respect of a non-domestic position. CFTC Release 6351-01,
Order dated 20 June 2001.
41 Prior to the time that the transfer of a position becomes final,
the clearing houses carry provisional entries in holding accounts
on their books that represent the amount of the obligation that
will be transferred between the clearing houses. While these
entries are provisional, the obligation to be transferred
represents an obligation of the transferring clearing house to
the receiving clearing house. Each clearing house typically
secures its obligations for pending provisional transfers by
providing a letter of credit issued by a third party bank to the
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either directly or through its clearing member,
sufficient to support the contract. If,
subsequently, it desires to offset that position
through execution of an off-hours trade at the
non-domestic exchange, the non-domestic
clearing house will require that the trader post
margin sufficient to support that offsetting
trade. That margin must remain posted with
the non-domestic clearing house until all of
the accounting entries necessary in the books
of the domestic and non-domestic clearing
houses to effect the transfer of the offsetting
position to the domestic clearing house
become final. Once the obligation is finally
transferred to the domestic clearing house,
the margin supporting the trade executed at
the non-domestic exchange can safely be
released by the non-domestic clearing house
for use by the trader. Moreover, because the
final transfer of the position offsets the original
position held at the domestic clearing house,
any remaining margin supporting the initial
trade at the domestic clearing house can also
be released for the use of the trader once the
offset is given effect. Through this treatment of
the margin posted at both exchanges, the
positions can be offset without any direct
transfer of funds between the clearing houses.
The clearing house accounts on each others
books, however, always hold the net position
transferred which is marked to market and
variation is paid.
A mutual offsetting system works best when
the levels of trading on each exchange are
roughly equal and the exposures between the
clearing houses are comparable. If the levels of
trading at the different exchanges are uneven,
then the intraday exposures of one clearing
house vis-à-vis the other and its members
would also be unequal.42 A mutual offsetting
system also can create operational, credit and
liquidity interdependencies between the linked
clearing houses. An operational problem at
one clearing house may immediately be
transferred to the other clearing house. A
delay or default in the payment of margin to
one clearing house also may subject the other
clearing house to increased credit and liquidity
exposures.
Cross-margining arrangements can be designed
to allow a trader to trade on more than one
exchange and to collateralise its positions
using assets held in one or more collateral
pools. However, because of legal impediments,
there are only a few examples of such
arrangements internationally. Cross-margining
arrangements can be structured in several
ways. In one possible structure, each clearing
member participating in the cross-margining
programme grants each clearing house a joint
first-priority lien on all assets held in either
clearing house to secure its obligations vis-à-
vis both clearing houses. Alternatively, the two
clearing houses may open a joint account into
which the required margin on specified
contracts is deposited. In that case, the
clearing house’s joint first-priority lien would
be limited to the funds in that joint account. In
the event of a default by the clearing member,
the assets of the clearing member on which
the clearing houses have a joint first-priority
lien would be applied to obligations owing to
each clearing house pro rata and  pari passu.
Generally, each clearing house can access
funds in such a joint cross-margin account only
upon the joint instructions of both clearing
houses. There also may be restrictions on a
clearing house’s ability to apply funds in the
joint cross-margin account to obligations
4.5 Cross-margining arrangements
42 Arrangements that operate similarly to a mutual offset system
are used to establish links between CSDs. In these
arrangements, each CSD becomes a member in and opens an
omnibus account at the other CSD. The local CSD can then
hold securities for the benefit of its members in its omnibus
account at the other non-domestic CSD. Transfers of securities
between members of the local CSD that are held and
deposited in the non-domestic CSD can then be transferred in
the books of the local CSD without the necessity of effecting a
transfer in the books of the non-domestic CSD. Through their
reciprocal omnibus accounts, the CSDs can also settle trades
between their respective participants across the link by debits
and credits to their respective omnibus accounts. For a
discussion of the risks associated with these kinds of links and
the methods by which those risks are managed, see the
CPSS/IOSCO  Recommendations for Securities Settlement
Systems (November 2001) at www.bis.org.owing with respect to non-cross-margined
positions.
Yet another structure is for the clearing
member to deposit collateral with each
clearing house and for each clearing house to
take a first-priority lien only on the assets
deposited with it. Each clearing house then
guarantees the obligations of its clearing
member vis-à-vis the other clearing house with
respect to specified cross-margined contracts
and obtains the agreement of its clearing
member to reimburse it for any funds that it is
required to pay to the other clearing house
under the guarantee. The clearing house then
also takes an additional lien on the clearing
member’s assets to secure its obligation to
make the reimbursement. If the clearing
member defaults, the clearing house will pay
the amounts it has guaranteed to the other
clearing house and will offset the margin it
holds to discharge the clearing member’s
obligations vis-à-vis itself, both on positions
held at that clearing house and with respect to
amounts paid under the guarantee.43
Arrangements with respect to the margining of
contracts also can vary. In the abstract, margin
owing to each clearing house by the
participating clearing member could be
calculated in the ordinary course of business
by each clearing house and each clearing house
would continue to operate its own risk
management programme. Available assets
posted at one clearing house (i.e. assets not
supporting existing positions at one of the
clearing houses) would be deemed to be
available to satisfy margin requirements with
respect to new positions established in either
clearing house. However, clearing houses
generally limit a cross-margining programme to
specified contracts that are economically
correlated and the clearing member is
permitted to net offsetting exposures across
the correlated products for the purpose of
calculating margin requirements. This cross-
clearing house netting reduces the aggregate
level of margin a clearing member is required
to post to collateralise the positions held
through the participating clearing houses.
Decreasing the aggregate level of collateral
clearing members are required to maintain to
collateralise offsetting positions held on
multiple exchanges maximises the efficient use
of a trader’s collateral and is one of the
principal benefits sought by clearing members
through a cross-margining programme.
Cross-margining programmes also allow
clearing members to consolidate their
accounting with respect to their trading on
both exchanges, to reduce their clearing costs
and to lower the operational risks associated
with making multiple international asset
transfers between the clearing houses of the
two exchanges involved. Cross-margining
programmes are also an alternative to a
consolidation of clearing houses as a method
of achieving cross-product clearing. For
example, the Options Clearing Corporation,
either itself or through its subsidiary, the
Intermarket Clearing Corporation (ICC), has
concluded cross-margining arrangements with
the CME and the Board of Trade Clearing
Corporation (BOTCC) to net and cross-
margin options on equities and futures on
stock indices that are economically
correlated.44
Cross-border cross-margining arrangements
can involve significant legal risk. First, the legal
regimes of the relevant jurisdictions may not
support the inter-creditor agreement between
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43 The advantage of this structure is that it obviates any conflict of
law issues arising out of holding assets or securing obligations
on a cross-border basis. The arrangements instituting this kind
of cross-margining programme are carried out as completely
domestic operations vis-à-vis each respective clearing house and
the clearing member.
44 However, mandatory requirements regarding the disposition of
margins upon the insolvency of a US futures commission
merchant requires that preferential treatment be given to
certain futures customers pursuant to these cross-margining
arrangements. These mandatory rules require that customers of
a futures commission merchant that do not participate in the
cross-margining programme never be disadvantaged by its
application. Further, if both securities and futures positions are
cross-margined, the futures clearing house is given a priority
claim over the securities clearing house in the event of the
bankruptcy of a cross-margined clearing member. However, in
such circumstances, the futures customers of the insolvent
clearing member have no claim against the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation that secures the claims of the customers
of US broker/dealers against losses arising out of the
broker/dealer’s insolvency. The organisation of cross-margining
arrangements for options on equities and futures on individual
securities is also anticipated as soon as futures on single
securities begin to be traded under recent amendments to the
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the clearing houses. In many jurisdictions, the
assets deposited as margin at a clearing house
must be handled and used in a specified way
upon the insolvency of a clearing member.
This mandatory disposition of assets by a
clearing house upon a clearing member’s
insolvency may not support the agreements
between the clearing houses granting each a
first-priority lien on the assets posted as
margin and a right to apply those assets to
the clearing member’s obligations vis-à-vis
both clearing houses upon default. Unless
the inter-creditor agreement is clearly legally
enforceable, a bankruptcy court with
jurisdiction may be inclined not to enforce it.
Setting aside the inter-creditor agreement
would increase the returns to unsecured
creditors of the defaulting clearing member. In
this case, too, one of the clearing houses will
have an unanticipated, uncollateralised
exposure and the defaulting clearing member
will probably not have sufficient
unencumbered assets to cover it.
Over and beyond that, each clearing house
participating in a cross-margining programme
will face additional legal issues relating to
the perfection of its liens on any assets posted
as margin in the other clearing house.
The netting of obligations owing under
economically correlated contracts for the
purpose of calculating margin requirements is
justified only if each clearing house has access
to the proceeds of the offsetting contract
cleared though the other clearing house. Each
clearing house will need to take steps to verify
that its liens are valid under the law of both
relevant jurisdictions. Lastly, each clearing
house may face issues relating to its right to
liquidate, or to have the other clearing house
liquidate, the margin held at the other clearing
house. Each clearing house may have the right
to liquidate collateral held by it in a particular
manner under its own internal rules and under
the law of the jurisdiction in which it is
located. However, clearing house rules often
operate without regard to requirements
relating to a debtor’s rights under due process
to receive notice of disposition of its assets
and other requirements with respect to the
manner of disposition of those assets. This
preferential treatment of clearing houses
reflects a policy choice to protect the public
markets. In some circumstances, however, that
preferential treatment may not extend to a
disposition of collateral held by a domestic
clearing house for the benefit of a non-
domestic clearing house.
These legal constraints have generally impeded
the conclusion of cross-border cross-
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The table below summarises the operational
developments discussed above. It concentrates
on those central counterparties that are
strongly involved in international derivatives
trading.
4.6 Comparative overview of international risk management
practices/arrangements in the United States and in Europe
Table 1
Operational developments in international  Europe United States
risk management practices/arrangements
• Acceptance of collateral in the form of  Clearnet, Eurex, LCH,  CME, BOTCC, NYCC
non-domestic currencies or securities of non-  OM Stockholm, 
domestic issuers at alocal bank or intermediary Wiener Börse AG
• Acceptance of margin at a bank or intermediary  Eurex BOTCC, CME (as part 
in a non-domestic jurisdiction or in multiple  of its currency exchange 
jurisdictions service), NYCC
• Clearing trades executed at an exchange in one  Clearnet (trades executed CME (trades executed
jurisdiction through a clearing house located in  at Euronext Brussels) at the Spanish MEFF)
another jurisdiction
Eurex Clearing (trades  NYCC (NYBOT’s 
executed at Eurex  FINEX Division) operates 
Switzerland) a trading floor in Dublin,
whose trades are cleared 
in New York*
• Mutual offsetting arrangements between a  None CME/Singapore
domestic and a non-domestic clearing house
•C ross-margining arrangements between a  CME/LCH/LIFFE (CME’s CME/LCH/LIFFE (CME’s
domestic and a non-domestic clearing house Eurodollar contract Eurodollar contract and
and LIFFE’s Euribor or LIFFE’s Euribor or
euro LIBOR contracts) euro LIBOR contracts)
* Although the floor of NYBOT’s FINEX Division is in Ireland, it is a US exchange that complies with all CFTC regulations.At present, there are several central
counterparty clearing houses operating in
Europe and in the United States. In addition, in
the euro area, there are several projects
under consideration to set up new central
counterparty clearing houses in countries
where there is currently no such market
infrastructure.
There are a number of models for structural
consolidation that derivatives clearing houses
can pursue, in addition to innovations in
operational arrangements to facilitate the
cross-border clearing of derivatives
internationally. The first model is domestic
horizontal consolidation, i.e. consolidation
between derivatives clearing houses in the
same jurisdiction, but attached to different
exchanges. The second and the third models
consist of horizontal consolidation with
derivatives clearing houses in other
jurisdictions (to permit cross-border clearing),
on the one hand, and horizontal consolidation
with securities clearing houses (or clearing
houses for other kinds of markets or products
regulated separately from derivatives) in their
own and other jurisdictions (to permit cross-
product clearing), on the other. The fourth
model is vertical consolidation with exchanges,
clearing houses and central securities
depositories (to create integrated trading,
clearing and settlement silos).
However, it is important to note that the
welfare effects of consolidation are ambiguous.
On the one hand, consolidation can help to
increase efficiency. First, the clearing industry
typically exhibits network externalities, i.e. the
value of the services and products a clearing
system offers an investor depend on the
number of investors purchasing the same
services and products. Thus, an increase in the
number of participants joining the clearing
system will have benefits that accrue to
existing members, as they will be able to share
a credit pool with more counterparties.
Second, the clearing industry is also strongly
characterised in operational terms by the
existence of economies of scale, i.e. the average
cost of clearing per transaction diminishes as
the number of cleared transactions increases.
The information technology (IT) infrastructure,
such as a database engine (the clearing
platform), networks and interfaces, is a
component of the market infrastructure
characterised by relatively high fixed costs.
Therefore, it would be more efficient to have
a single database engine clearing transactions
on multiple markets than to have several
database engines for each local market. In
particular, an uncontrolled proliferation of
clearing infrastructures could create
inefficiencies. For instance, the existence of a
fragmented infrastructure would oblige banks
and investment firms to participate in more
than one central counterparty clearing house
and, therefore, to maintain several interfaces
and to cope with different standards, market
practices and clearing rules. Third, the clearing
industry is characterised by the existence of a
strong vertical relationship between the various
complementary components of the market
infrastructures. The settlement of a securities
transaction takes place only after the matching
and clearing of the transaction has occurred.
Therefore, a further integration of the
complementary components of the
infrastructure (along the value chain of a
securities transaction) allows economies of
scope, i.e. efficiency gains from the joint
operation of complementary components of
the infrastructure, to be realised. A single
supplier may be able to provide a package of
services at a cost lower than multiple suppliers
supplying components of the same services
individually. In addition, the participants will
benefit from not having to set up different
interfaces and implement different procedures
in order to reach various components of the
infrastructure. From a risk management
perspective, consolidation permits the central
counterparty to gain access to information on
the exposures of clearing members across
multiple markets. This information allows the
central counterparty to manage the aggregate
risk assumed by clearing members across
exchanges on a consolidated basis. In an
environment where multiple central
counterparties exist and operate separately,
without a mechanism to share information
on exposures, no single central counterparty
is able to analyse the exposures of its
5 Consolidation in the financial
market infrastructure
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counterparties. This is particularly the case in
jurisdictions, such as the United States, where
there is a high degree of commonality in the
identity of clearing members at the various
derivatives clearing houses.45
Consolidation can also result in a number of
inefficiencies and risks. Consolidation may lead
to conflicts of interest and governance
problems within the clearing house. In
particular, there are difficulties in organising
equitable guarantee arrangements (e.g. what
incentive does an equity market participant
have to share in the costs of a derivatives
market participant’s failure?). In addition, the
interests and needs of local market players and
those of larger global market players are quite
distinct and hard to reconcile. Moreover,
the potential cost savings of consolidation
through the organisation of cross-margining
arrangements may be limited in that cross-
margining is only possible in cases of contracts
with reciprocal or highly correlated risk. Any
increase in legal risk arising from of cross-
margining arrangements must also be assessed
relative to the benefits of those arrangements.
Furthermore, the consolidation process is
costly in itself and, in a consolidated structure,
there is a lack of competition among clearing
houses that may lead to limited incentives to
improve services and to reduce prices.46 There
may also be limited incentives to foster
innovation and a high risk of x-inefficiencies.
Moreover, consolidation results in a
concentration of risk and entails the danger of
spillover effects. In other words, any
disturbance in one segment of the financial
market may result in similar corresponding
disturbances in other segments.47 As a result,
consolidation may have serious systemic
implications. Finally, in the case of systemically
important entities, there is a risk of moral
hazard if systems are considered “too big to
fail.” Consolidation also can create additional
legal or regulatory burdens. Multi-product
clearing, for instance, requires more risk
controls, more demanding and costly risk
management techniques and more rigorous
oversight on the part of regulators and central
banks. In addition, there can be co-ordination
problems between authorities with
competence over different products and an
increased risk of conflicts of law in the case of
cross-border consolidation. Lastly, there are a
number of further legal uncertainties in the
case of cross-product and cross-currency
clearing relating to netting, insolvency and the
general risks incident to all currency exchange
transactions.
Finally, since central counterparty clearing
houses monitor participants’ trading books, if a
particular class of members dominates the
governance process, other members or users
of the clearing house may fear that those
dominant members will abuse the information
gathered by the clearing house or otherwise
adversely affect its operations, unless
appropriate measures are put in place.
Governance arrangements that do not assure
the fair and proper operation of the clearing
house would lead to an unacceptable increase
in social costs. As a result, additional
regulation, supervision or oversight of clearing
houses may be necessary.48
Potential efficiency gains through consolidation
depend on whether central counterparty
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45  US clearing houses have the ability to share exposure
information regarding positions on domestic exchanges through
the Joint Audit Committee. The Board of Trade Clearing
Corporation also operates an on-line collateral surplus and
excess and net pay and collect information system through
which all US futures clearing houses and the Options Clearing
Corporation can access information on the level of profits and
losses and available collateral regarding all participating clearing
members.
46 However, the United States’ experience suggests that
innovation may be driven by the demands of market users,
irrespective of the level of competition among clearing houses.
47 Clearing different kinds of contracts in a separate clearing
house can limit the exposure of clearing members to those
specified kinds of risks. For example, an agricultural trader may
not want to take or share the risk that a trader in the financial
futures market will default. Agricultural traders may determine
to clear their agricultural contracts in a separate clearing house
to limit their exposure to defaults by other agricultural traders.
Clearing system designers and clearing system members must
assess the extent to which the cost savings associated with
economies of scale outweigh any increased potential exposure
associated with clearing unrelated types of contracts in a single
clearing house. However, clearing different kinds of contracts in
different clearing houses may impact on the ease with which an
individual broker may be able to provide services relating to
different kinds of contracts and may create artificial, practical
barriers to firms engaging in business at multiple clearing houses.
48 However, current evidence indicates that clearing houses in
both Europe and the United States have been effective in
preventing the abuse of confidential financial information in
their possession.clearing is a natural monopoly. In the short
term, consolidation helps to maximise
network externalities and economies of scale.
However, these short-term advantages have to
be balanced against the inefficiencies that may
be caused by the absence of competition (e.g.,
lack of dynamism, lack of innovation) in the
long run. Indeed, there are numerous
examples of natural monopolies – for instance,
in the field of telecommunications, energy and
transportation – which are progressively being
dismantled.
Put in economic terms, consolidation will help
to increase efficiency to some extent, through
economies of scale and scope as well as
network externalities. Beyond a certain point,
however, further consolidation may lead to
diseconomies of scale resulting in a welfare
loss.
The following sections will discuss in greater
detail the consolidation processes in central
counterparty clearing in Europe and in the
United States.
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5.1.1 Examples of consolidation in Europe
In Europe, most countries have established
central counterparty clearing houses which are
attached to particular local organised markets
(stock exchanges or derivatives exchanges). As
a result, central counterparty clearing houses
in Europe have traditionally confined their
services to single countries. However, the
pattern of a single central counterparty
clearing house serving one market in one
country is changing. At the same time, EU
clearing houses are expanding the range of
products they are able to clear.49
There are numerous examples of this
structural consolidation in Europe. Examples
of horizontal consolidation among derivatives
clearing houses include:
• the London Clearing House, which clears
all futures exchanges in the United
Kingdom (reflecting a domestic horizontal
consolidated approach to clearing);50
• Clearnet SA, which now clears the principal
derivatives exchange markets in France,
Belgium and the Netherlands (reflecting
a cross-border horizontal consolidation);
and
• Eurex Clearing, which now clears
derivatives for Eurex Deutschland and
Eurex Switzerland as well as certain
derivatives contracts cross-listed with the
Helsinki Exchanges (also reflecting a cross-
border horizontal consolidation).
Examples of horizontal consolidation among
derivatives and securities clearing houses
include: the London Clearing House, which
now clears both derivatives and equities, and
Clearnet SA, which also clears both derivatives
and equities. Eurex Clearing, too, has
announced its intention to begin clearing
equities, along with cash market debt
instruments and derivatives.
Examples of vertical integration (the creation
of silos for trading, clearing and settlement)
include:
• the consolidation of Deutsche Börse, Eurex
Deutschland, Eurex Switzerland, Eurex
Clearing and Clearstream, an international
central securities depository, into the same
corporate structure; and
• the ongoing consolidation of the Paris,
Brussels and Amsterdam exchanges,
Clearnet SA (their clearing house), Sicovam,
Necigef and CIK (the French, Dutch and
5.1 Vertical and horizontal structural consolidation in Europe
49 For a discussion of proposals to offer centralised collateral
management services for OTC derivatives that are concluded
and collateralised bilaterally without interposition of a central
counterparty, see Kathleen Tyson-Quah, “Collateralisation v.
Clearinghouse: Credit Risk Management for OTC Derivatives,”
in Swaps and Off-Exchange Derivatives Trading: Law and
Regulation (E. Bettelheim, H. Parry, and Prof. W. Rees, Eds.,
London 1996).
50 Except for OMLX, which is cleared by OM Clearing.Belgian central securities depositories
respectively) and Euroclear (an international
central securities depository) into an
affiliated corporate structure.
Examples of the development of cross-product
clearing include:
• the London Clearing House, which now
clears equities, cash market debt
instruments, repurchase agreements,
options, futures, and OTC derivatives;
• Clearnet, which now clears equities,
repurchase agreements, cash market debt
instruments, options, and futures; and 
• Eurex Clearing, which now clears cash
market debt instruments, repurchase
agreements, options, and futures.
Cross-product clearing arrangements do vary,
however. Clearing houses may specify various
methods of calculating the contribution
clearing members in each product class must
make to a reserve, guarantee or indemnity
fund. Clearing houses may also specify various
methods of, or limitations on, a clearing
member’s ability to net obligations between
economically correlated products across
product classes for purposes of calculating
margin requirements.
5.1.2 Factors underlying the consolidation
process in Europe
Several factors unique to Europe underlie this
structural consolidation.
In the euro area, the adoption of the euro has
accelerated the consolidation process in the
financial market infrastructure. By eliminating
exchange risks, the introduction of the single
currency resulted in a dramatic rise in cross-
border trades and contributes to the
completion of the internal market for financial
services in the European Union. These
developments motivate a reorganisation of the
EU financial infrastructure and permit a
rationalisation of the organisation of the
financial infrastructure to reflect the current
state of the art in trading, clearance and
settlement arrangements.
The EU approach to the regulation of financial
services and markets is intended to facilitate
structural consolidation. The regulation of the
investment services activities of banks and
investment firms has been co-ordinated
through the Consolidated Banking Directive,51
the Investment Services Directive, and the
Capital Adequacy Directives.52 Authorised
firms can hold securities, futures, options and
other OTC derivatives on behalf of a
customer in the same account.
Markets for securities, futures and other OTC
derivatives are regulated in a co-ordinated and
unified regime in each EU Member State, and
the Investment Services Directive and the
Settlement Finality Directive facilitate the
cross-border operation of securities, futures
and other derivatives markets and settlement
systems in the EU internal market. In this way,
regulatory barriers to a structural
consolidation of securities and derivatives
clearing and settlement systems are
progressively being removed in Europe.
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5.2.1 Examples of consolidation in the
United States
In the United States, horizontal consolidation
in the clearing and settlement infrastructure
for equities, US government securities,
emerging market debt securities and
5.2 Vertical and horizontal structural consolidation in the
United States
51 Directive 2000/12 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the
business of credit institutions, Official Journal L 126,
26/05/2000, p. 1, as amended by Directive 2000/28, Official
Journal L275, 27/10/2000, p. 37.
52 Directive 93/6 on the capital adequacy of investments firms
and credit institutions, Official Journal L 141, 11/06/1993, p. 1,
as amended by Directive 98/31, Official Journal L 204,
21/07/1998, p. 13, and by Directive 98/33, Official Journal L
204, 21/07/1998, p. 29.mortgage-backed securities, respectively, has
already occurred. Legislative amendments to
US securities law have resulted in the
consolidation of securities clearing and
settlement primarily in the subsidiaries and
affiliates of the Depository Trust Clearing
Corporation (DTCC).53 The Depository Trust
Company (DTC), the National Securities
Clearing Corporation (NSCC), the
Government Securities Clearing Corporation
(GSCC), the Emerging Markets Clearing
Corporation (EMCC) and the MBS Clearing
Corporation have all been consolidated within
an affiliated corporate structure, headed by
DTCC.54
DTC, the US central securities depository
(CSD), settles all corporate, municipal and
mortgage-backed securities in the United
States.55 NSCC clears and provides central
counterparty services for all retail equity,
corporate and municipal bond transactions in
the United States, processes most mutual fund
orders and provides clearing services for some
markets in US government securities,
mortgage-backed securities and emerging
market debt instruments. EMCC provides
clearing, multilateral netting, central
counterparty and risk management services for
emerging market debt products. GSCC
provides trade comparison, netting, central
counterparty and settlement services for US
government securities markets. MBS Clearing
Corporation provides post-trade comparison,
netting, risk management and pool notification
services to the mortgage-backed securities
market. A separate company not affiliated with
DTCC, the Options Clearing Corporation
(OCC), provides clearing and central
counterparty services for exchange-traded
options on securities. However, there is an
element of competition in the provision of
settlement services in the United States.
Service providers other than DTCC affiliates
may provide competing services in some areas,
e.g. securities trade matching services for
institutions with an interface to DTC.
This overview reflects that there are four
central counterparties for securities within the
United States: NSCC for equities and
corporate and municipal bonds, EMCC for
emerging market debt instruments, GSCC for
US government securities, and Options
Clearing Corporation for exchange-traded
options on securities.56 MBS Clearing
Corporation is considering offering central
counterparty services for mortgage-backed
securities.
Each of these clearing houses has separate
rules for defining the amounts that clearing
members are required to post in the clearing
house’s indemnity fund and as margin on
individual positions. Each clearing house also
has separate rules regarding the allocation of
losses upon a default by a clearing member.
One result of this corporate structure for
securities clearing is a limitation on the liability
of the clearing members of the respective
clearing house. A clearing member has liability
only with respect to losses arising from
contracts in the product class cleared by the
clearing house of which he is a member.
Moreover, the affiliation of all the clearing
houses, other than OCC, within the corporate
structure of DTCC also facilitates the co-
ordination of their activities from an
operational and technical perspective.
5.2.2 Factors underlying the maintenance
of multiple clearing houses in the
United States
Notwithstanding the experience of the
securities clearing arrangements under the
national market system, futures clearing
organisations have not consolidated, although
there are no regulatory impediments to their
consolidation, and studies have also indicated
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53 For an overview of the history of the consolidation of the
clearing of equities and options on equities in the United
States, see European Securities Forum, Euro CCP, ESF’s
Blueprint for a Single Pan-European Central Counterparty
at http://www.eurosf.com/publications/~Blueprint.pdf.
54 The Boards of Directors of GSCC, EMCC, and MBS Clearing
Corporation have recently also approved proposals to become
wholly-owned subsidiaries of DTCC.
55 The CSD for US government securities is the Federal Reserve
System that holds government securities through its Fedwire
system.
56 These clearing houses have instituted various cross-margining
arrangements to achieve cross-product netting for purposes of
establishing margin requirements.that significant cost savings may be realised if
futures clearing houses were consolidated.57
However, several factors may explain the
maintenance of a decentralised futures clearing
environment in the Untied States:
• Industry-specific markets may result in a
lack of commonality in the identity of
traders from market to market and may
obviate the traders’ business interest in
mutualising the risk of loss across
exchanges through a single clearing house.
The practice among US clearing houses of
requiring clearing members to take joint
and several liability for the obligations of the
clearing house arising from cleared trades, a
practice uncommon in Europe, also may
lead clearing members to conclude that a
single clearing house is not in their business
interest. The organisation of multiple
clearing houses may operate to limit their
liability.58
•T he risks associated with clearing certain
kinds of contracts or for certain kinds of
traders (e.g. petroleum contracts for major
oil companies) may lead to variations in risk
management practices across clearing
houses. For example, the capital
requirements imposed on clearing members
may vary from clearing house to clearing
house.
• Each clearing house generally clears
transactions on one exchange in the United
States, and the exchanges are often
competitors. The exchange may perceive its
clearing operations to be an adjunct of its
trade execution services and may perceive
that its clearing arrangements give it a
competitive advantage over other
competing exchanges. Differences in
corporate culture at the exchanges and
their associated clearing houses may also
make co-operation between exchanges with
respect to clearing difficult.
•A   consolidation of futures clearing houses
would concentrate risks in one entity and
could potentially increase systemic risk.
However, current market forces may
ultimately prompt a re-examination of the
structural organisation of clearing
arrangements for futures and other derivatives
in the United States. Investors and financial
services companies have an increased desire to
invest in products and instruments, and to
engage in activities, that are currently
regulated in a different manner on a sectoral
basis (i.e. across the banking, securities,
futures, and insurance sectors) in the United
States.
Some initial steps have been taken to modify
the regulatory regimes for banks, securities
firms and futures commission merchants as
well as securities and derivatives markets
that might ultimately lead to an evolution in
the structure of clearing and settlement
arrangements for securities, futures and other
derivatives. The adoption of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act permits banks, securities firms
and insurance companies to be held within the
same corporate structure. Entities in different
sectors held in the same corporate structure
might desire the ability to clear and settle
within a single operation all products and
positions held within the financial group.
The Commodity Futures Modernisation Act
(CMFA) of 2000 also introduced the following
changes regarding clearing:
•a  clearing house designated by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission is
now permitted to clear futures traded on a
designated contract market, a derivatives
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57 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Board of Trade
Clearing Corporation (which clears for the Chicago Board of
Trade) formally explored a merger in the late 1990s, but
ultimately decided not to complete it.
58 In situations where a clearing member has unlimited liability to
the clearing house regarding defaults in cleared contracts, a
parent company of a clearing member can control the extent of
its liability through its control over the level of capitalisation of
the clearing member. The practice of requiring unlimited liability
of clearing members is also being abandoned in some cases.
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange recently amended its clearing
rules in a way that limits the liability of its clearing members.
Under the rules of some clearing houses, a clearing member
can also withdraw its obligation to cover losses at the clearing
house with respect to trades consummated subsequent to the
notice of withdrawal. However, in such a case, the clearing
member must take steps to terminate its status as a clearing
member. transaction facility, contracts on
commodities exempted or excluded from
the application of the Commodity Exchange
Act and certain other cash market products
and OTC derivatives contracts;
•c ontracts based on commodities exempt or
excluded from the Commodity Exchange
Act and those other cash market products
and OTC derivatives contracts can also be
cleared by a clearing house that is
registered or designated by other US
financial regulators, e.g. by a securities
clearing agency registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission;
• futures on individual securities can be
cleared at a clearing house approved by
either the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission;
• clearing houses that clear single stock
futures must ultimately arrange linkages
with each securities clearing agency to
provide for delivery-settled single stock
futures products and must establish linkages
with each other to facilitate cross-market
fungibility and offsetting; and
• foreign clearing houses can clear exempt
foreign government securities for US
customers if permitted to do so by a
banking regulator, the Securities and
Exchange Commission or the CFTC.
However, even under the new provisions of
the CFMA, securities and futures can be
cleared in the same clearing house only if the
clearing house is registered as both a
derivatives clearing organisation by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and
a securities clearing agency by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Moreover, margin
held by such a dually registered clearing house
with respect to futures and most securities
products could not be held and treated in the
same way in the same account upon the
bankruptcy of an intermediary. Generally, the
rules regarding the treatment of amounts
posted as margin vary with respect to futures
and securities. Rules regarding the disposition
of margin on futures on single stocks, which
constitute both a future and a security, are
currently under review by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the CFTC.
Consequently, while the new regulatory
scheme reflects a general movement towards
cross-product clearing and will encourage the
conclusion of cross-margining arrangements
between securities and futures derivatives
clearing houses for single stock futures, some
regulatory impediments remain regarding
cross-product clearing in the United States.
Historically, the approach of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission has been to
allow the structure of futures clearing to be
determined by the markets, subject to certain
requirements for participants and certain
“core requirements” that must be met by a
clearing house. Moreover, it is unlikely that
this regulatory approach will change. The
financial services industry itself, however, may
ultimately conclude that securities, futures and
other derivatives should be permitted to be
cleared and held through the same
intermediary in the same account. This would
permit the most flexible use and management
of an investor’s capital and would permit the
continuing evolution in risk management
practices supporting the financing and holding
of financial instruments, both on a domestic
and on an international basis. However, such
an evolution in the public policies regarding
clearing in the United States may ultimately
require legislative action by the United States
Congress. The costs to clearing houses, their
members and other market users of such a re-
organisation of clearing arrangements relative
to the benefits that would be derived is likely
to be the primary factor in both the financial
services industry’s and the Congress’
assessment of the utility of any such proposed
reorganisation.
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examples of structural consolidation in the
United States and in Europe, distinguishing
between different models of structural
consolidation that derivatives clearing houses
can pursue.
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5.3 Comparative overview of structural consolidation in the
United States and in Europe
Table 2
Type of Consolidation Europe United States
A domestic horizontal consolidated  London Clearing House (clearing all OCC (clearing all exchanges 
approach to derivatives clearing in the  future exchanges in the United trading standardised options
same jurisdiction Kingdom, except OMLX) on equities)
Horizontal consolidation with derivatives  Clearnet (derivatives and securities in None
clearing houses in other jurisdictions  France, Belgium, and the Netherlands);
(to permit cross-border clearing)
Eurex (derivatives in Germany and 
Switzerland)
Horizontal consolidation with securities Clearnet (derivatives and securities); None 
clearing houses in their own and other 
jurisdictions (to permit cross-product  London Clearing House (derivatives and 
clearing) securities)
Vertical consolidation Clearnet (clearing) with Euronext  DTCC (only clearing and
(trading) and Euroclear (settlement); settlement)
Eurex (clearing) with Deutsche Börse 
(trading) and Clearstream (settlement)From an oversight and regulatory perspective,
the organisation of risk management practices
on an international basis presents certain
challenges to central banks and financial
market regulators. Central banks have an
interest in ensuring the smooth functioning of
clearing and settlement systems because of the
potential impact a major disruption may have
on the smooth functioning of payment systems
and on financial stability in general. Disruptions
in the derivatives trading and clearing process
might prevent market participants from
receiving timely funds that they had intended
to use to make other payments. As a result,
the risk of bottlenecks in the payment systems
would be very large and could substantially
affect financial markets. In addition to these
systemic implications, derivatives regulators
are concerned with the potential non-systemic
impact of a significant failure within the
clearing and settlement infrastructure on (i)
the financial condition of individual regulated
firms, (ii) the protection of individual
customers using and holding derivatives
positions through the clearing and settlement
infrastructure and (iii) the functioning of the
market for its intended purposes, i.e. price
discovery and risk transfer.59
As noted earlier in this paper, the most
significant trends in the development of
derivatives clearing fall into two categories: the
increasing importance of operational clearing
arrangements between clearing houses at a
cross-border level and structural consolidation
in the clearing and settlement infrastructure.
Both developments imply particular risks and
present particular challenges to central banks
and regulators.
6 Issues for central banks
and regulators
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The growing internationalisation of markets
creates new sources of risk. In particular, the
following risks and regulatory challenges are
relevant.
6.1.1 Contracts denominated in
non-domestic currencies
Derivatives in which the underlying asset is a
foreign exchange rate, a foreign interest rate
or a foreign stock index are often
denominated in the associated foreign
currency. Moreover, money settlements on
these contracts will typically be carried out in
a foreign currency. Volatility of the foreign
currency must be taken into account when
determining the adequacy of the collateral
posted by the clearing member to secure its
positions or exposures.
If domestic assets60 are used as margin
collateral for a contract denominated in a non-
domestic currency and if the contract
envisages settlement by delivery of the non-
domestic currency, the clearing house must
take two implications into account. First, the
clearing house will need additional time in its
default procedures to convert the proceeds of
the collateral into the non-domestic currency
in order to cover the defaulting clearing
member’s positions. Second, for this purpose,
the clearing house may use accounts
denominated in the non-domestic currency in
a domestic bank or maintain accounts in the
non-domestic currency at banks abroad.
Occasionally (although this is most important
in the case of a cross-border link), a clearing
house will open an account with the central
bank of the currency of issue. If remote
access to that central bank is not provided,
the clearing house will have to depend
on commercial bank settlement. If a
correspondent bank abroad is used, the
6.1 Risks and regulatory challenges relating to cross-border
clearing activities
59 The 1987 market crash in the United States prompted
recognition that the central bank, the finance minister and
financial markets regulators all have an interest in the design
and functioning of the financial infrastructure. This recognition
lead to the formation of the President’s Working Group on
Financial Markets, composed of the Federal Reserve Bank, the
Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
60 Or other assets which are denominated in a currency different
to that of the derivatives contract.settlement period may be extended because of
delays inherent in correspondent banking
operations (i.e. delays due to operating across
different time zones or due to the need to
confirm the finality of cross-border transfers).
6.1.2 Collateral issued in a non-domestic
jurisdiction and held in a
non-domestic central securities
depository
Securities issued in a non-domestic jurisdiction
and deposited and held in a non-domestic
central securities depository (CSD) may also
be accepted as margin collateral. Non-
domestic securities may be held by a clearing
house in one of three ways: indirectly through
a global custodian bank or other local CSD
member; indirectly through a link maintained
by the domestic CSD with the foreign CSD;
or directly by means of remote access of the
clearing house to the non-domestic CSD. The
complexities inherent in holding securities
cross-border through a chain of intermediaries
or by remote cross-border access may extend
the time required to deal with assets held in a
non-domestic CSD. Those complexities may
increase both the risks and the costs of
holding non-domestic securities.
6.1.3 Non-domestic participants
The evaluation of a non-domestic member’s
financial capacity and the monitoring of its
open positions can become more complex as
a consequence of variations in legal, accounting
and regulatory requirements applicable to the
non-domestic member in its home jurisdiction.
In the event of the default of a non-domestic
clearing member, actions of the clearing house
could be challenged under the insolvency laws
in the other jurisdiction. In the field of
derivatives settlement, in which the clearing
house acts as the central counterparty,
membership requirements are of the utmost
importance. This means that, in practice, many
procedural requirements may be imposed
regarding settlement to ensure the solvency of
a non-domestic clearing member or the ability
of the clearing house to realise the assets
posted by the non-domestic clearing member
as collateral. In particular, a legal assessment of
potential conflicts between the clearing
house’s default procedures and the insolvency
laws in the country of the non-domestic
member must be carried out. Information-
sharing agreements with non-domestic
regulators or clearing houses are also
important.
In order to evaluate and address cross-border
risk management practices and clearing
arrangements in their respective jurisdictions,
central banks and financial market regulators
are interested in ensuring that their own
domestic legal framework and the legal
framework of other jurisdictions with whose
clearing houses their own clearing houses are
connected or linked support enforceable
arrangements for cross-border risk
management and clearing. Aspects of the legal
framework with which central banks and
financial market regulators may be concerned
include laws on the netting of obligations in
the linked systems, laws on the finality of
settlement instructions and the finality of
payments and deliveries of securities, laws on
the perfection and enforcement of rights
against collateral in the other jurisdiction and
insolvency laws specifying the treatment of
claims and the disposition of assets held in the
other jurisdiction, imposing an automatic stay,
or reversing transactions pursuant to “zero-
hour” rules.
Regulators charged with assuring the integrity
of a clearing house’s risk management
practices and protecting domestic customers
and investors must also be mindful of the
variations in laws and rules regarding the
segregation of customer assets and in the
holding systems for financial instruments
internationally. The nature of a clearing
house’s interest in margin that may be posted
with a non-domestic clearing house, or
through an international chain of
intermediaries, may vary significantly across
jurisdictions. Variations in the rights and
property interests inuring to the benefit of a
clearing house regarding cash or securities
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intermediaries may bear on the integrity of the
clearing house’s risk management practices
and on the risks undertaken by its customers.
Cross-border clearing also requires central
banks and financial market regulators to
address issues relating to the provision of
liquidity in a financial crisis to support firms
operating internationally, the concentration of
information outside their jurisdiction and
the need for arrangements to exchange
information between the clearing houses
directly and between central banks and
regulators internationally.
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Because central counterparties become the
buyer to every seller and the seller to every
buyer on cleared contracts, thereby replacing
the original counterparty on each side of the
transaction vis-à-vis the other, counterparty
credit risk is managed on a centralised basis by
the central counterparty. Where no central
counterparty service is provided, counterparty
credit risk is managed on a decentralised basis
by each participant contracting in the market.
Therefore, when a central counterparty is
used, the systemic implications of an
inappropriately designed clearing or risk
management system, or of a management
failure, are correspondingly larger than if the
clearing house does not offer a central
counterparty service.61 Since such risks
increase with the size of the central
counterparty, consolidation among central
counterparty clearing houses may increase the
concentration of risk. Moreover, horizontal
and vertical consolidation of clearing houses
and settlement systems and cross-product
clearing of equities, cash market debt
instruments and derivatives contracts may also
result in a decrease in the overall amount of
collateral currently supporting positions held
within the international financial system and in
a corresponding increase in the degree of
leverage in the financial system.62
Moreover, consolidation may create the risk
of spillover or contagion effects in the case of
cross-product clearing. To an important
extent, clearing systems determine the
exposures among and linkages between
financial institutions. Therefore, clearing
systems are channels through which contagion
effects can be transferred through the financial
system. Disturbances in the equity market, for
instance, may result in similar, corresponding
disturbances in the derivatives market, and
vice versa. As a result, consolidation among
central counterparty clearing houses may have
serious systemic implications.
Another closely related issue is that
consolidated entities, once they have become
systemically important, might be perceived to
be “too big to fail.” Consolidation may,
therefore, create moral hazard for regulators
and central banks.
Furthermore, consolidation creates additional
risk management and regulatory burdens. In
particular, multi-product clearing requires
increased risk controls and more demanding
and costly risk management techniques. In
addition, cross-border consolidation can make
co-ordination between regulatory authorities
both more difficult and more important, can
give rise to gaps or inconsistent application of
regulatory schemes due to variations in the
6.2 Risks and regulatory challenges relating to
structural consolidation
61 However, although a clearing house does not provide a central
counterparty service, it can provide other services related to
counterparty credit risk management, including monitoring the
level of credit or potential future credit exposures, issuing
margin calls and issuing or processing settlement instructions.
62 If a trader today maintains positions in more than one market
and if those markets are each cleared by a separate clearing
house, the trader must collateralise the full amount of his net
obligation to each clearing house. If the clearing houses (but not
necessarily the markets) consolidate and if certain of the
positions taken in one market will hedge or offset exposures
taken in the other market, the trader will be able to take
advantage of an enhanced ability to net the exposures owing to
the consolidated clearing house, thereby reducing his overall
exposure and reducing the amount of collateral or margin he is
required to post at the clearing house to support his positions.
If many traders are able to take advantage of this opportunity,
the overall amount of collateral posted in the financial system
as a whole may potentially be significantly reduced, thereby
increasing the degree of overall leverage in the financial system.regulatory approaches or techniques used by
different regulators and can exacerbate the
risk of conflicts of law. In addition, cross-
product and cross-currency clearing can give
rise to significant legal uncertainties.63
Finally, because central counterparty clearing
houses monitor participants’ trading books,
there is a risk that information will be
improperly used. Such an abuse of information
might lead to significant social costs. As a
result, additional regulation and supervision
may be necessary.
In view of the above, there is a strong case for
regulatory oversight of derivatives exchanges
and clearing houses in order to ensure that
financial safeguards reflect the potential for
systemic risk. This is particularly true because
financial market participants may not be
prepared to plan for and address contagion or
other cross-border risks without the
assistance of a regulatory and legal framework
that supports maintaining the integrity of the
market and the use of collateral for the
purposes posted. First, as demonstrated by
certain failures of financial institutions (e.g.
Herstatt, Barings plc, etc.), markets do not
price very low probability risks of catastrophic
events properly. Second, market participants
may not be in a position to assess the
increasingly complex clearing house risk
management practices. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, market participants cannot
and will not take into account the system-wide
consequences of a default even if they are fully
informed about the relevant risk exposures
and linkages. As a result, central banks and
financial market regulators should be sure that
the legal framework for clearing and
settlement both creates the right incentives
for clearing providers and members to handle
potential problems and supports the liquidity
of the markets.
Lastly, however, any risks or challenges
associated with consolidation among central
counterparties must be evaluated in light of
the risks existing in the current clearing
environment. While consolidation in central
counterparty clearing may present numerous
risks and challenges to regulators, it may
represent an improvement over, and
diminution of the risks inherent in, existing
clearing arrangements.
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63 Cross-product clearing gives rise to legal uncertainties relating
to the netting of obligations and the disposition in bankruptcy
of assets posted as a margin by a market participant. Clearing
in multiple currencies gives rise to legal risks relating to netting
and the timing of finality of currency exchange transactions.ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 41
Differences in the general approach to financial
services regulation in the United States and
the European Union bear significantly on the
organisation of clearing and on the trends in
the development of clearing in the two
jurisdictions. The following table provides a
comparative overview of the general approach
to financial services regulation and the general
structure of the markets in the United States
and the European Union.
6.3 Consequences of the US and EU regulatory schemes
for financial services with respect to clearing
Table 3




• Sectoral approach to financial services
regulation. The banking, securities, futures, and
insurance sectors are regulated separately.
• Universal banking is not permitted.
• Each sector uses different regulatory
mechanisms.
• FLittlew attempts haves been made to harmonise
requirements across sectors.
• A sectoral approach minimises the
circumstances requiring co-operation between
regulators. Each sectoral regulator focuses
primarily on its own sector. The Federal Reserve
Board exercises a general oversight authority.
Cross-sectoral issues relating to clearing and
settlement are co-ordinated through the
President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets.
• Functional approach to financial services
regulation. Activities and products regulated in a
substantially similar way, independently of the
sector of the firm engaged in the activity or
offering the product.
• Universal banking is permitted.
• High degree of commonality and harmonisation
in regulatory mechanisms across sectors (in




• The United States operates a dual banking
system. Both federal government and state
governments have competence to authorise the
operation of a bank. National banks are
regulated only at the federal level. State banks
are regulated at both the state and the federal
level.
• Securities underwriting, brokerage and dealing
are regulated at both the federal and the state
levels. National securities exchanges are
authorised at the federal level by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Federal law pre-
empts state law in the case of any inconsistency
between them.
• The CFTC authorises futures brokerage and
futures exchanges at the federal level. Federal
law on futures pre-empts state law to the extent
necessary to assure the proper operation of the
futures markets. The CFTC can also prosecute
fraud and other misconduct with respect to
certain OTC contracts.
• Insurance companies are regulated primarily at
the state level.
• Each EU Member State may authorise the
operation of a bank, subject to minimum EU
requirements. It has discretion to determine how
to allocate regulatory competence over banks
between competent authorities.
• Each EU Member State authorises the operation
of each investment firm or regulated market,
subject to minimum EU requirements. It also
allocates regulatory competence on investment
firms between competent authorities.
• Each EU Member State authorises the operation
of an insurance company, subject to minimum
EU requirements. Each Member State also
allocates the regulatory competence over
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Structural
differences 
• Banking groups generally are generally limited
to banks and bank-related subsidiaries. The
primary function of banks is deposit- taking and
lending.
• Securities firms generally are generally
restricted to securities brokerage, dealing and
underwriting (but may conduct other kinds of
business in unregulated affiliates).
• Futures brokerage is handled by specialised
entities that also may also be licensed to handle
securities business.
• The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) permits
the organisation of financial holding companies
with ownership interests in banks, securities
firms, and insurance companies within the same
corporate structure.
• Bank management has less influence on the
management of non-financial companies relative
to the influence exercised by bank management
in the European Union.
• Corporate control is traded on the market to a
greater extent than in the European Union.
• There is a high degree of retail participation in
US securities markets.
• The percentage of issued securities of public
companies registered for public trading (the
“public float”) is higher than that of EU
registered public companies. 
• Financial services are offered through complex
financial groups composed of banks, securities
firms, insurance companies, and non-financial
companies.
• Investment services can be offered directly by
banks.
• Futures are regulated within a co-ordinated
regime together with securities, each being
categorised as financial instruments.
• Bank management has a relatively high degree
of influence on non-financial company
management.
• Corporate control is traded off the market in
many continental EU jurisdictions
• The level of public float is low relative to that




• High degree of commonality in the regulatory
mechanisms used by bank supervisors in the
United States and Europe. As an exception, the
United States has organised an only limited
degree of consolidated supervision of banking
with other sectors.
Regarding securities:
• The US securities market is very open and
transparent reflecting a consistent approach to
capital formation and corporate governance.
• The United States does not require futures
exchange members who trade only for their
own account (other than “floor traders”) to be
authorised. (Securities dealers are required to
become authorised.)
• Regarding exchange-traded derivatives, there is
a high degree of commonality in exchange
regulation, customer protection and risk
management techniques between the United
States and Europe.
Regarding banking:
• Europe organises a high degree of consolidated
supervision of banking with other sectors.
Regarding securities:
• The European Union relies to a lesser extent on
self-regulation than the United States.
• EU jurisdictions generally require authorisation
for exchange members trading only for their
own account.
• There are variations in accounting and
disclosure requirements relating to issuers both
between EU Member States and relative to those
applicable in the United States and other third
countries.
• There are significant differences in the capital
requirements for EU intermediaries compared to
the capital requirements imposed in the United
States. There are also some variations in
securities holding systems and in customer
protection mechanisms relating to the holding
and use of securities by broker/dealers both
between the European Union and the United
States and within the European Union.
Table 3 (continued)
Issue United States European UnionTable 3 (continued)
Issue United States European Union
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The regulatory structure in the United States
has the following consequences with respect
to clearing:
• Securities clearing and derivatives clearing
are regulated by different federal regulators
and take place in separate clearing houses.
•N either securities broker/dealers nor
futures commission merchants can hold
both securities and futures in the same
account at the same clearing house.
• Cross-product clearing is difficult, impeding




• The SEC authorises all securities clearing
agencies.
• The clearing and settlement system is largely
centralised under one holding company – the
Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation
(DTCC). Subsidiaries of this holding company
clear all exchange-traded securities (other than
exchange-traded options) and a substantial
percentage of certain types of OTC securities in
the United States.
• A separate clearing house clears exchange-
traded options listed on multiple exchanges.
• Clearing houses authorised by the CFTC, the
SEC or a banking regulator can now clear
certain types of OTC transactions. 
• Authorisation requirements depend on national
law.
• Clearing was historically conducted on a
decentralised basis in each individual
jurisdiction. However, some cross-border
consolidation has occurred and is expected to
continue. The European System of Central




• The SEC has competence over the clearing of
derivatives that are securities (e.g. options on
equities). The SEC and the CFTC share
competence over the clearing of futures on
single stocks.
• The CFTC regulates futures clearing houses
(Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000) and aspects of the operation of designated
foreign clearing organisations acting with US
products and customers.
• Generally, a separate clearing house clears for
each futures exchange.
• There is currently little legislative or political
pressure for a consolidation of derivatives
clearing houses. The exchanges and brokers
have varying opinions on this issue. There is
considerable pressure from brokers to allow
cross-product clearing. 
• Authorisation requirements depend on national
law.
• Some structural consolidation has occurred, both
on a domestic and a cross-border basis, with
several clearing houses clearing multiple




• Commercial laws relating to the posting of
collateral in securities and derivatives
transactions have been informally harmonised in
the United States through the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
• Approval of clearing house rules by the
competent federal regulators reinforces the laws
and procedures relating to the disposition of
margin and collateral held by a clearing house.
Some issues relating to the notice and other due
process requirements that must be observed by a
private party when it realises collateral taken in
a bilateral, principal-to-principal transaction
remain unresolved. 
• Commercial laws relating to the posting of
collateral in securities settlement systems have
been minimally harmonised through the
adoption and implementation of the Settlement
Finality Directive.
• Commercial laws applicable to the posting of
collateral in bilateral, principal-to-principal
transactions vary from Member State to Member
State. The proposed Directive on collateral, if
adopted, would minimally harmonise the laws in
the Member States to facilitate the taking of
cross-border collateral.•T here are legal impediments to a clearing
house netting the obligations owing by
entities in a company group to the clearing
house.
The regulatory structure in the European
Union has the following consequences with
respect to clearing:
• There is no single Community clearing
house regulator, nor is there currently a
single passport for clearing houses who
wish to provide cross-border clearing
services within the EU internal market.
Consequently, in many respects, EU clearing
houses continue to have to work with
multiple regulators and to comply with
multiple regulatory schemes to operate on
a cross-border basis within the Community.
• Clearing remains largely fragmented along
national lines.
•W hile legal impediments to posting non-
domestic collateral in a designated
securities settlement system have largely
been obviated with the adoption of the
Settlement Finality Directive, practical
operational impediments continue to
hamper the posting of collateral on a
cross-border basis. Furthermore, there
are numerous legal and operational
impediments to the posting of collateral on
a cross-border basis in the OTC markets
where transactions are not cleared through
a designated securities settlement system.
• Cross-product clearing is facilitated.
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both commonalties and differences in the
present situation and in the trends in the
evolution of derivatives clearing in the United
States and in the European Union.
Clearing houses on both continents are trying
to develop a more integrated domestic
infrastructure for securities and derivatives.
In the European Union, the fragmentation of
derivatives clearing results from the historic
market organisation within EU Member States
and the continuing development of a less-than-
fully integrated infrastructure. This is
particularly relevant in the euro area. In this
respect, EU clearing houses are pursuing both
horizontal and vertical consolidation of the
trading, clearing and settlement infrastructures
in Europe. However, conflict of interests, co-
operation failures and competition between
financial centres are hampering the process of
integration. A process of convergence and
further harmonisation of the requirements for
admission to regulated markets, central
counterparty clearing houses and settlement
systems will be helpful in this regard. Common
organisational and functional requirements,
including risk management procedures, ensure
a level playing field for different systems and
facilitate their access to foreign market
participants. The European Commission is
considering these issues in the proposed
amendments of the Investment Services
Directive and has dealt with them in its
communication on issues concerning clearing
and settlement, released in June 2002. This
could lead to a new Directive on these
subjects. In addition to supporting the work of
the European Commission, the Eurosystem is
contributing to removing obstacles to
integration, acting along two main lines. On
the one hand, it acts as a catalyst for
improvement by encouraging discussions
among the relevant players and, on the other,
it is considering how to harmonise its own
procedures and operations relating to the
operation of the TARGET system and the
clearing and settlement of transactions incident
to its monetary policy operations. Lastly, the
Eurosystem, the European Commission and
EU securities regulators, acting through the
Committee of European Securities Regulators
(CESR), have instituted a forum to review the
standards applicable in the field of clearing and
settlement in Europe.
In the United States, the decentralised clearing
of futures transactions derives primarily from
the business decisions of exchanges and
clearing houses to maintain separate
operations. In addition, the sectoral regulatory
regimes in the United States impede the
development of cross-product clearing
arrangements.
If current trends in the development of
clearing arrangements continue, it is likely that
there will be an increasing consolidation of
clearing and central counterparty services for
derivatives within Europe and that EU clearing
houses soon will clear all financial instruments,
including both securities and derivatives, within
the same clearing house on a cross-border
basis. Derivatives clearing houses in the United
States will continue to explore operational
arrangements to achieve cross-border and
cross-product clearing. If these operational
arrangements do not prove adequate to meet
the demands of market participants, the
financial services industry may ultimately
request that the United States Congress adopt
legislation to facilitate cross-border (i.e.
international) and cross-product clearing in the
United States.64 The trends in Europe also
reflect the fact that the adoption of the euro
and the general effort to complete the internal
market for financial services within the
European Union provide a catalyst for
innovations in the fields of clearing and
settlement that does not exist in the United
States. As a consequence, developments in
these areas are currently being pursued with
more vigour in Europe than in the United
States.
As a general proposition, clearing houses in
both the United States and the European
7 Conclusions
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64 The development of clearing arrangements for securities futures
products may lead to further innovations in clearing in the
United States. However, the ultimate effects of these
developments are not yet apparent.Union are exploring ways to facilitate cross-
border clearing at a global level. There is some
pressure on clearing houses on both
continents to develop ways to collateralise
trades and positions at multiple exchanges
using the same collateral pool in one
jurisdiction. Clearing houses are generally
attempting to respond to this pressure by
developing operational arrangements between
clearing houses. There is also some pressure
on clearing houses on both continents to
provide arrangements for cross-product
clearing to achieve the benefits of netting
offsetting positions in correlated products for
the purpose of setting margin requirements.
Lastly, trends in the evolution of clearing and
settlement will continue to challenge central
banks and financial market regulators
internationally. Given their mutual interest in
the robustness of clearing and settlement
arrangements, there may be an increasing need
for central banks and financial market
regulators to collaborate and co-operate on an
international basis to fulfil their respective
roles and objectives in the oversight,
supervision and regulation of cross-border
clearing and settlement systems.
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there has been growing demand for central
counterparty clearing. Several central
counterparty clearing houses already exist in
the euro area and a number of mergers and
alliances are currently under consideration or
being implemented. Economies of scale and
network externalities seem to favour a high
degree of concentration. A group of major
global investment banks has therefore
expressed support for the idea that Europe
should only have one central counterparty
clearing house, which would be a multi-
currency and multi-product (equities, bonds,
derivatives and commodities) service.
However, there is no single view, particularly
within the euro area, about the infrastructure
that should prevail.
The Eurosystem is carefully monitoring and
analysing these developments. Indeed, central
counterparty clearing could have implications
for the smooth execution of monetary policy
operations, the smooth operation of payment
and settlement systems and the stability of the
financial markets in general. The consolidation
process adds to the complexity of the issue:
on the one hand, consolidation in central
counterparty clearing could help to increase
efficiency in the clearing and settlement of
securities; on the other hand, the potential
systemic consequences of a central
counterparty’s failure increase with its size.
Annex 1
The Eurosystem’s policy line with regard to
consolidation in central counterparty clearing
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1 Background
(a) The need for risk management standards
In view of its statutory responsibilities with
respect to the smooth operation of monetary
policy and payment systems and its concerns
in the field of financial stability, the Eurosystem
has an interest in the functioning of central
counterparties that clear substantial amounts
of euro-denominated assets.
It is essential that standards for risk
management be established for central
counterparties. This work will be conducted in
co-operation with the other relevant
authorities (and, in particular, with the newly
created Committee of European Securities
Regulators). The process of setting standards
has already started, with initiatives driven by
market participants or pursued within the
framework of international co-operation
between regulatory bodies. The European
Association of Central Counterparty Clearing
Houses (EACH), for instance, has developed
standards for central counterparties, which
should now be assessed by the Eurosystem.
(b) The need for a “domestic” infrastructure
located in the euro area
Currency areas have traditionally developed
their own domestic infrastructures for
payment systems, securities settlement
systems, stock exchanges, etc. In this regard, it
is important to distinguish clearly between
“domestic” systems, on the one hand, and
“international” (or “global”) systems, on the
other. A “domestic” system is a system
which handles mainly or exclusively assets
denominated in one currency. An
“international” system is a system which
handles several currencies at the same time.
Defining a domestic system on the basis of
currency enables public authorities (and the
Eurosystem in particular) better to address
their regulatory/oversight concerns. In
practice, the logical geographical scope of a
market infrastructure is the currency area, as
witnessed by the ongoing consolidation of
stock exchanges, payment systems and
securities settlement systems in the euro area.
Indeed, payment, clearing and settlement
systems may trigger liquidity problems, which
2. Policy concernscan only be addressed by competent local
authorities, in particular central banks. This is
the case today in the United States and Japan.
Now that the need for securities clearing is
growing rapidly in the euro area, it would
appear that a coherent domestic infrastructure
for the euro will have to develop.
Such an infrastructure should logically be
located in the euro area, as is the case with
core infrastructures in other monetary areas.
This would be preferable from a regulatory
perspective and would help the Eurosystem, as
the “central bank” of the euro, to ensure the
smooth functioning of payment systems,
efficient monetary policy implementation and
financial stability. Existing agreements among
central banks give a prominent role to
“domestic” authorities, as do international
agreements among central banks and, possibly,
with securities regulators. The existence of
such agreements would make it easier to
achieve effective oversight of central
counterparties established in the euro area.
Furthermore, the location of central
counterparties in the euro area would
facilitate the provision, when deemed
necessary and appropriate, of central bank
money in euro.
(c) Neutrality: market forces, co-operation
and public policy decisions
There are various forms of integration in
central counterparty clearing, such as
interoperability, alliances, joint ventures and
mergers. All of these approaches have in
common that they could help to improve
market efficiency. Market participants need to
look for solutions that are optimal in the long
run, i.e. capable of maximising economies of
scale and minimising the average transaction
costs for the final users. However, it is
acknowledged that interim solutions could be
necessary in practice. The Eurosystem intends,
at this stage, to remain neutral on the path
that will eventually be taken towards improved
efficiency and the optimal solution.
The three main driving forces pushing market
participants to adopt efficient solutions in the
field of central counterparty clearing are
competitive pressures, co-operation between
market participants and, when needed, policy
decisions. The Eurosystem shares the view of
the “Committee of Wise Men” that the
process of consolidation should, in general, be
driven by the private sector, which does not
mean, however, that there are no public policy
issues involved. Public authorities should help
by removing unfair and unjustified barriers to
integration and competition, such as legal
impediments and a lack of standardisation.
(d) Defining efficient market structures
The issue of efficient market structures is
closely related to the question of whether or
not central counterparty clearing is a natural
monopoly. It is clear that, in the short term, a
single infrastructure would maximise network
externalities and economies of scale.
However, these short-term advantages have
to be balanced against the inefficiencies that
may be caused, in the long run, by the absence
of competition (e.g. a lack of dynamism
and innovation). At a time when former
natural monopolies, in the fields of
telecommunications, energy and transportation
for instance, are progressively being
dismantled, the emergence of new monopolies
in the financial sector might be questionable.
Vertically integrated structures where trading,
clearing and settlement are made available to
the customer as a package enable local
markets to be more efficient by providing
better and lower-priced services. However,
they may also present some drawbacks in
terms of lack of competition. The
disadvantages can be overcome provided that
customers can choose between systems along
the “value chain” (i.e. trading, clearing and
settlement). It is therefore crucial that access
to essential facilities, whether vertically
integrated or not, should not be unfairly
impeded. In the case of common ownership of
trading platforms, the central counterparty
clearing house and settlement systems, for
example, access to post-trading facilities
should not be made conditional upon the
execution of trades on the affiliated trading
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inter-connectivity of trading, clearing and
settlement systems may not be easy to achieve
because it may present operational difficulties
and have the potential for systemic risks. It
should be noted that no central counterparty
clearing house or settlement system can be
compelled to establish links if this is not
commercially viable or compromises the
sound prudential operation of the system.
However, the reasons for failing to make links
available should not be so open-ended as to
allow abuse. Finally, open access to essential
facilities must ensure a level playing field for
service providers. In particular, legal
difficulties, preferential taxation rules and lack
of standardisation must not lead to unfair
competition.
(e) Co-operation at a global level
The existence of domestic infrastructures does
not prevent the emergence of international
infrastructures. The international infra-
structures are superimposed on domestic
ones, however, and are not designed to
replace them.
The Eurosystem supports co-operation in
central counterparty clearing at a global level.
Key concepts in this respect are legal feasibility
and interoperability. Interoperability means
agreeing upon common processes, methods,
protocols and networks to enable co-
operation between central counterparties at a
technical level. This would allow central
counterparty clearing houses worldwide to
develop links between them so that
agreements on cross-collateralisation and
cross-margining could be reached. This may or
may not lead to the creation of international
or global clearing houses.
Furthermore, when global multi-currency
systems handling euro are up and running, the
Eurosystem should be involved in their
oversight, given its interest – as the euro’s
central bank of issue – in the smooth
functioning of such systems.
In the light of the analysis above, the
Governing Council of the European Central
Bank has come to the following conclusions:
a) Owing to the potential systemic importance
of securities clearing and settlement
systems, the Eurosystem has an interest in
central counterparty clearing and considers
that it is essential to establish, in co-
operation with the other relevant
authorities, effective risk management
standards.
b) The natural geographical scope for any
“domestic” market infrastructure (including
central counterparty clearing) for securities
and derivatives denominated in euro is the
euro area. Given the potential systemic
importance of securities clearing and
settlement systems, this infrastructure
should be located within the euro area.
c) The process of consolidation of central
counterparty clearing infrastructure should
be driven by the private sector, unless
there are clear signs of market failures.
d) Whatever the final architecture, it is
essential that access to facilities for trading,
clearing and settlement should not be
unfairly impeded. This policy of open and
fair access should ensure the safety, legal
soundness and efficiency of securities
clearing and settlement systems, guarantee
a level playing field, and avoid excessive
fragmentation of market liquidity.
e) The Eurosystem supports co-operation
between providers of central counterparty
clearing services at a global level and should
be involved in monitoring global multi-
currency systems handling euro as part of
its interest in ensuring their smooth
operation.
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List of US derivatives clearing houses
Clearing house Exchanges cleared 
New York Clearing Corporation Cantor Financial Futures Exchange
New York Board of Trade
Board of Trade Clearing Corp. Chicago Board of Trade
MidAmerica Exchange
Merchant’s Exchange of St. Louis
BrokerTec Clearing Company, LLC BrokerTec Futures Exchange
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Clearing Division) Chicago Mercantile Exchange
EnergyClear Corporation EnergyClear is a derivatives clearing corporation not
affiliated with a trade execution facility that provides
clearing and settlement services for OTC energy
derivatives contracts concluded between eligible
commercial entities on a principal-to-principal basis.
FutureCom FutureCom
Intermarket Clearing Corporation  Amex Commodities Corporation
(a subsidiary of Options Clearing Corporation) Philadelphia Board of Trade
Kansas City Board of Trade Clearing Corp. Kansas City Board of Trade
Minneapolis Grain Exchange Minneapolis Grain Exchange
New York Mercantile Exchange New York Mercantile Exchange
OnExchange Clearing Corporation OnExchange Board of Trade
Options Clearing Corporation American Stock Exchange (options)
Chicago Board Options Exchange (options) 
International Securities Exchange (options)
Pacific Exchange (options) 
Annex 2 – List of US derivatives clearing houses
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List of EU derivatives clearing houses
Clearing house Exchanges cleared 
Athens Derivatives Clearing House (ADECH) Athens Derivatives Exchange (ADEX)
Bolsa de Derivados do Porto Bolsa de Derivados do Porto
Clearnet SA Euronext Paris SA
Euronext Brussels
Euronext Amsterdam
[Euroclear (international central securities depository)]
Cassa di compensazione e garanzia MIF-MTO (Italian government bond derivatives market)
IDEM (Italian stock derivatives market).
Eurex Clearing AG Eurex Deutschland
Eurex Zurich
Helsinki Exchange (specified contracts)
FUTOP Copenhagen Stock Exchange (CSE) (equities and
derivatives)
HEX Helsinki Exchanges HEX Helsinki Exchanges (equities and derivatives)





Intercontinental Exchange (certain contracts)
RepoClear (OTC repurchase agreements)
SwapClear (OTC swap agreements)
MEFF RF and MEFF RV MEFF RF and MEFF RV
OM Stockholmsbörsen AB OM Stockholmsbörsen and Oslo Børs (equities and
derivatives)
Fixed income derivatives traded OTC, but reported to the
PMX exchange (a subsidiary of OM)
Other OTC derivatives
Wiener Börse AG Wiener Börse AG
Annex 3 – List of EU derivatives clearing houses
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General background information – EU clearing houses
Clearing 
house Clearnet Eurex Clearing AG London Clearing House
1 The ownership structure of the Deutsche Börse AG, which was previously concentrated in the German banking industry,
changed after the completion of the exchange’s initial public offering in February 2001.
Annex 4 – General background information – EU clearing houses




Clearnet is a credit institution
(limited-purpose bank) under
French law.
Clearnet is a subsidiary of
Euronext Paris, thus belonging
to the Euronext Group with
Euroclear holding a 20% stake
in Clearnet.
Eurex Clearing AG is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Eurex
Frankfurt AG, founded under
German law in June 1998. Eurex
Clearing AG is owned at 50% by
the groupe of Deutsche Börse1.
AG and 50% by the Swiss Stock
Exchange.
London Clearing House (LCH) is
a public limited company (plc).
Since October 1996, it has been
owned by its members (75% of
the share capital), the London
International Financial Futures
and Options (LIFFE), the London
Metal Exchange (LME) and the
International Petroleum Exchange
(IPE) (25% of the share capital),
and is run on a non-profit basis.
Scope of
the business
Central counterparty for the
three Euronext markets
(Euronext Paris SA, Euronext
Brussels, Euronext Amsterdam).
Until the implementation of the
single common platform
(Clearing 21), all branches will
operate their own systems.
Services for stock exchange
transactions, financial and
exchange-traded commodity
futures and options, equity and
index options and OTC
securities trades.
Clearing house for the Eurex
exchanges in Frankfurt and Zürich
which operate according to the
same rules.
It clears futures, options, and
options on futures (pre-paid and
deferred style) on financial
instruments, like interest, bonds,
indexes and stocks. It also clears
repurchase agreements and cash
bonds of its own ECN markets and
will implement clearing on cash
equities (Euro nominated, collective
safecustody German shares,
executed on Xetra and Frankfurt
Stock Exchange) by 1 quarter 2003.
It has plans to extend its services to
other securities and OTC markets
during 2003 and 2004. Eurex
Clearing AG also operates as a
clearing house facilitator for the
European Engergy Exchange.
LCH clears all trades executed
on LIFFE, LME and IPE,. LCH
also acts as central counterparty
for trades executed through the
London Stock Exchange’s SETS
system.
LCH has added a service for
Pfandbriefe repurchase
agreements and cash bonds to its
RepoClear system, in addition to
Belgian, Dutch and German
government repurchase
agreements and cash bonds.
LCH also offers services for




Cash deposits and margin calls
of clearing members are settled
in the three RTGS systems
(ELLIPS, TBF and TOP). OTC
positions in repurchase
agreements and securities
transactions traded on Euronext
regulated markets are settled
through the securities settlement
systems of the three countries.
Euro transactions are settled in
central bank money. Non-euro
transactions may be settled in
commercial bank money.
Eurex uses central bank money
and securities as collateral for the
settlement of margins. Clearing
members need a securities account
and a pledged securities account with
Clearstream Banking and/or Sega-
InterSettle and an account with the
central banks in Germany and/or
Switzerland. Eurex Clearing may
allow the use of a correspondent bank
recognised by Eurex Clearing for cash
clearing with Eurex Clearing. There
are plans to implement in 2003
collateral holdings at CrestCo and to
implement GBP as clearing currency.
The settlement of cash underlying
products is done as DvP/RvP. Today,





For repurchase agreements and cash
bonds CBF/Deutsche Bundesbank,
CBL or Euroclear.
Cash equities will settled CBF/
Deutsche Bundesbank as of its launch
date in 2003.
Margin payments are made via
LCH’s Protected Payment
System (PPS). Each clearing
member has an account with at
least one participating bank and
LCH with all participating banks.
After confirmation of the margin
payment on the member’s behalf
to LCH, a bank is irrevocably
committed to do so. Payments
made by transfers between the
accounts of clearing members
and LCH at each participating
bank.Annex 5 – Risk management – EU clearing houses
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Table 7
Risk management – EU clearing houses
Clearing 




firms and entities whose single
purpose is to provide clearing
services for financial instruments
and who fall within the scope of
the prudential supervision of the
Commission Bancaire can be
admitted as members. Additional
criteria (such as minimum capital
requirements) also have to be
fulfilled.
Former clearing members of the
Brussels and Amsterdam
Exchanges became remote
clearing members of Clearnet. By
31 December 2002, Belgian and
Dutch clearing members not
fulfilling Clearnet’s financial
criteria have to submit and
implement a plan indicating how
they intend to comply with them.
Fulfilment of financial and
operational access criteria is
checked for new applicants, and
monitored on an ongoing basis.
Eurex has a flexible licence
approach and imposes a number
of access requirements on its
members: 
Basic Requirements
(i) Requirements regarding the
legal status of clearing members
(members must be licensed by
their national supervisory
authorities for deposit-taking
business, lending operations and
commission business);




EUR 12.5 million for direct
clearing members and EUR 125
million for general clearing
members.
Bonds and repurchase agreement
clearing: minimum equity capital
requirements EUR 17.5 million
for direct clearing members and
EUR 175 million for general
clearing members
Equity clearing: minimum equity
capital requirements EUR 2.5
million for direct clearing
members and EUR 25 million for
general clearing members (this
equity capital must be on the top
of any capital if one of the
previously mentioned clearing
licences exist)
Users of exchanges and markets
served by LCH must either be
members of LCH or have a direct
or indirect clearing relationship
with a member of LCH. LCH sets
minimum capital requirements for
clearing members. These members
also have to satisfy LCH
regarding their ability to meet
day-to-day operational
requirements, including the
adequacy of their back-office and
banking arrangements. Trading
levels and patterns are monitored
throughout the day. Thus, LCH
imposes a minimum standard of
creditworthiness on firms to




“Defaulter pays” approach where
margins are the first level of
financial resources. There are two
types of margin requirements:
(i) initial margin deposits (to
cover the upcoming risk on
the open positions registered
with the clearing house); and
(ii) variation margin or margin
calls to cover the price
difference between the
original price of the
registered position and the
marked-to-market price.
Valuation of exposures and
margin calls at least daily.
Additional deposits required for
positions bearing risks that are
insufficiently covered by existing
deposits. Intraday price variation
limits apply to futures and
options. If a limit is breached, an
intraday margin call is made.
The margin required from each
member is recalculated daily on
the basis of the total risk exposure
of the member’s entire account.
Further on Eurex calculates 
intra-day margin at the same
basis.
Eurex may demand at any time
that a clearing member maintain a
higher or supplementary margin in
cash or in securities or book-entry
securities acceptable to Eurex on
the basis of the risk assessment it
makes. Supplementary margin in
the appropriate currency must be
transferred immediately to the
relevant central or correspondent
bank account, or to the pledged
securities account with
Clearstream or SIS (the Swiss
CSD).
LCH accepts cash or high-quality
bonds as margin to cover the
value of amounts owed to LCH.
It calculates initial margin on all
open positions, but also collects
variation margin to re-establish
this protection at close of business
and, if necessary in fast-moving
markets, makes intraday calls for
more margin. Variation margin
must be provided in cash for most
contracts, while initial margin
may be provided in cash or
acceptable non-cash collateral.
It restricts the types and amounts
of collateral that it will accept as
initial margin, mainly to
government bonds, cash and bank
guarantees.ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 54
Table 7 (continued)
Clearing 
house Clearnet Eurex Clearing AG London Clearing House
Additional
resources
Following the implementation of
Clearing 21, Clearnet plans to
establish a single clearing fund
for all clearing members, which
will total at least EUR 220
million. A separate clearing fund
will be created for the OTC
markets.
Beside margins and funds,
Clearnet relies on its insurance
arrangements and its own capital.
Clearnet’s net equity capital of
EUR 130 million is supplemented
by insurance covering potential
losses of up to EUR 150 million
and by an unconditional
“parental” guarantee from
Euronext Paris.
In addition to margin, clearing
members have to contribute to a
clearing fund, the amount of
which is determined by Eurex
Clearing AG for each clearing
member. This contribution can be
provided in the form of bank
guarantees and/or cash or
securities collateral. Eurex
Clearing AG may use funds from
its annual surplus to set aside
reserves for the clearing fund to
contribute to the fulfilment of the
obligations of any clearing
member that may default on its
obligations. If the clearing fund
should be used to cover a default
the clearing member will have
to make a contribution to the
clearing fund within 10 days to
re-establish the fund’s original
amount exchange days.
In the event of a default by a
clearing member causing LCH to
incur a loss greater than the
defaulter’s margin, LCH has the
following financial resources at its
disposal:
(i) a cash-based default fund, to
which all members of LCH
contribute (totalling over
GBP 330 million as at April
2002);
(ii) up to GBP 10 million of
LCH’s profits in the current
year;
(iii) GBP 100 million of
insurance cover, in the event
of losses of GBP 150 million
or more; and
(iv) own funds of over
GBP 50 million.Annex 6 – General background information – US clearing houses*
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Table 8
General background information – US clearing houses*
Clearing  Board of Trade Clearing
house Chicago Mercantile Exchange Corporation New York Mercantile Exchange
* The clearing houses covered by these tables were selected at random as representative of clearing houses operated in the
United States. Other US clearing houses share attributes similar to the clearing houses covered. Reference should be made to
the internal rules and bylaws of each individual exchange for a complete exposition of the matters summarised in these
tables. The information included in these tables was extracted from information included on the internet websites of each




On 13 November 2000, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Inc. (CME)
de-mutualised and transformed
itself from a non-profit,
membership-owned organisation
to a profit-oriented, shareholder-
owned, public corporation
established in Delaware. As part
of its de-mutualisation, the CME
issued Class A and B common
shares to its former members. On
3 December 2001, the CME was
reorganised into a holding
company and the exchange
became a wholly owned
subsidiary of Chicago Mercantile
Exchange Holdings Inc. (CME
Holdings) through a merger of
CME into a subsidiary of CME
Holdings. Shareholders in CME
automatically became
shareholders in CME Holdings.
The clearing house operates as a
division of the exchange.
The Board of Trade Clearing
Corporation (BOTCC) is a
business corporation established
in Delaware and owned by
clearing member firms that trade
on the Chicago Board of Trade
(CBOT) and the MidAmerica
Commodity Exchange.
The New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) is a business
corporation owned by its
members. The clearing house





The CME offers futures and
options on futures in four product
areas: interest rates, stock indices,
foreign exchange and physical
commodities. The CME clearing
house division acts as central
counterparty for all futures and
options transactions traded at the
exchange.
BOTCC acts as central
counterparty for all transactions
traded at the CBOT, the
MidAmerica Commodity
Exchange and the Merchant’s
Exchange of St. Louis. The
CBOT and its affiliated
MidAmerica Exchange offer
agricultural, financial, stock index
and metals products. The
Merchant’s Exchange of St. Louis
primarily offers futures on freight
rates.
The NYMEX conducts trading
through two divisions, the
NYMEX Division and the
COMEX Division. Generally,
futures and options on futures on
energy products are traded
through the NYMEX Division,
while futures and options on
futures on gold, silver, copper and
the FTSE Eurotop 100 index are
traded through the COMEX
Division.Table 8 (continued)
Clearing  Board of Trade Clearing
house Chicago Mercantile Exchange Corporation New York Mercantile Exchange
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Settlement
procedures
Currency and US government
securities posted with the clearing
house are settled by deposits and
credits to CME’s accounts at one
of several commercial settlement
banks. The settlement banks settle
cash transfers in central bank
money through the Federal
Reserve System’s Fedwire system.
Transactions in US government
securities are also settled through
the Fedwire system. Equity
securities posted as a security
deposit or initial margin are
settled by credit to a CME
account at Deposit Trust
Corporation (DTC), the CSD for
equities in the United States, or to
a CME account at a securities
broker/dealer. [CME accepts
foreign currency through accounts
at non-domestic commercial
banks that may be converted into
US dollars to be posted as margin
or that may be used to effect
delivery of a foreign currency
under a futures contract traded on
the exchange.] Margin posted in
connection with MEFF contracts
cleared through the clearing house
may also be deposited in a CME
account at a commercial bank in
London or Spain.
Currency and US government
securities posted with the clearing
house are settled by deposits and
credits to BOTCC’s accounts at
one of several commercial
settlement banks. The settlement
banks settle cash transfers in
central bank money through the
Fedwire system. Transactions in
US government securities are also
settled through the Fedwire
system. Equity securities posted
as a security deposit or initial
margin are settled by credit to a
BOTCC account at DTC or to a
BOTCC account at a securities
broker/dealer. Non-domestic, G-7
government bonds posted as a
security deposit or initial margin
are settled by credit to a BOTCC
account at a commercial bank in
London. BOTCC’s London
commercial bank maintains an
account in its name at Euroclear
through which it holds those
securities for the benefit of
BOTCC.
Currency and US government
securities posted with the clearing
house are settled by deposits and
credits to NYMEX’s accounts at
one of several commercial
settlement banks. The settlement
banks settle cash transfers in
central bank money through the
Fedwire system. Transactions in
US government securities are also
settled through the Fedwire
system. Equity securities posted
as a security deposit or initial
margin are settled by credit to a
NYMEX account at DTC or to a
NYMEX account at a securities
broker/dealer.Annex 7 – Risk management – US clearing houses
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Table 9
Risk management – US clearing houses
Clearing 
house Chicago Mercantile Exchange Chicago Board of Trade New York Mercantile Exchange
Membership
requirements
CME clearing members must
meet fiscal and moral integrity
requirements, as well as
demonstrate sufficient financial
capitalisation to justify the risks
assumed in clearing their trades.
Clearing members may be
corporations, limited liability
companies, partnerships (including
limited partnerships and general
partnerships) or co-operative
associations.
Clearing members must maintain
adjusted net capital in excess of
the greatest of:
• USD 2 million; or 
• 8% of domestic and foreign




requirements for all domestic
and foreign futures and
options on futures contracts,
excluding the risk margin
associated with naked long
option positions; or 
• CFTC minimum regulatory
capital requirements; or 










competence. Applicants must meet




purchase the prescribed number of
shares of stock in the BOTCC and
meet any other requirements
imposed by the BOTCC. After
being admitted to the BOTCC,
clearing members must continue
to meet and comply with the
ongoing qualifications for
membership.
Capital requirements for clearing
members are established by the
Risk Committee, based on the
type of entity, the nature of the
entity’s business and the entity’s
trading volume. Thus, a clearing
member’s capital requirements
may vary over time based upon a
clearing member’s business
activity. Generally, BOTCC’s
ongoing capital requirements for
registered entities track those
imposed by the CFTC and/or
SEC.
Clearing members must have a
minimum working capital of
USD 2 million, calculated in
accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles or,
if it is a CFTC-registered clearing
member, in accordance with
CFTC regulations, and must
maintain an account with a bank
in the City of New York which
meets exchange capital and rating
requirements. In addition, the
clearing member, like all member
firms, must own and hold two
seats on the exchange.
Clearing members must also make
a deposit of an amount that
reflects the firm’s capital (and the
size of trades they can guarantee)
to the guarantee fund of the
clearing house. On the NYMEX
Division, the minimum deposit is
USD 100,000 in cash or US
Treasury bills with a face value of
USD 120,000. The maximum
deposit is USD 2 million. The
capital-based floating scale for
guaranty fund deposits of
NYMEX Division clearing
members is posted on the
NYMEX’ website. COMEX
Division clearing members must
deposit the equivalent of 10% of
the firm’s capital, up to
USD 2 million.
The clearing house also imposes





Clearing members post initial
margin and variation margin on
behalf of themselves and their
customers. Variation margin calls
are made several times a day. The
clearing house may use any other
assets of a defaulting clearing
member available to the clearing
house, such as the proceeds of the
sale of any membership or any
shares owned in the exchange
assigned to the exchange for
clearing qualification, to defray
obligations vis-à-vis the clearing
house.
Customer funds are segregated
pursuant to CFTC requirements.
Clearing members post initial
margin and variation margin on
behalf of themselves and their
customers. Variation margin calls
are made several times a day. The
clearing house may use any other
assets of a defaulting clearing
member available to the clearing
house, such as the proceeds of the
sale of any membership or any
shares owned in the exchange
assigned to the exchange for
clearing qualification, to defray
obligations vis-à-vis the clearing
house.
Customer funds are segregated
pursuant to CFTC requirements.
Clearing members post initial
margin and variation margin on
behalf of themselves and their
customers. Variation margin calls
are made several times a day. The
clearing house may use any other
assets of a defaulting clearing
member available to the clearing
house to defray obligations vis-à-
vis the clearing house.
Positions taken in excess of
capital-based position limits must
be super-collateralised at the
clearing house through the deposit
of additional margin.
Customer funds are segregated
pursuant to CFTC requirements.ECB • Occasional Paper Series No. 5 • September 2002 58
Table 9 (continued)
Clearing 
house Chicago Mercantile Exchange Chicago Board of Trade New York Mercantile Exchange
Additional
resources
If those amounts are insufficient
to discharge the defaulting
member’s obligations vis-à-vis the
clearing house, the obligations are
discharged by use of funds from
the following sources (listed in
the order of priority):
(i) surplus funds of the
exchange;
(ii) the security deposits posted
by other clearing members
pro rata in proportion to
their aggregate security
deposits; and
(iii) proceeds from any default
insurance maintained by the
exchange.
Any remaining balance is assessed
against all clearing members pro
rata in proportion to their
aggregate security deposits up to
the limits of their liability as set
out in the exchange rules.
The clearing house also maintains
a standby credit facility to address
liquidity needs.
The clearing house has discretion
to use one or more of the
following resources to satisfy the
BOTCC’s obligations arising from
a clearing member’s default:
(i) committed standby credit
facilities from a consortium
of banks;
(ii) default insurance; and
(iii) the capital of the clearing
house.
The clearing house also maintains
a trust fund for the benefit of
customers of its clearing
members. The trustees of this
fund have the sole discretion to
utilise these funds for the purpose
of reimbursing the customers of a
failed clearing member.
If those amounts are insufficient
to discharge the defaulting
member’s obligations vis-à-vis the
clearing house, the obligations are
discharged by use of:
(i) the exchange’s surplus, as
determined by the Board of
Directors;
(ii) the guarantee fund; and
(iii) funds based on a prorated
assessment of other clearing
members, according to
trading participation.Cash clearing: a method for clearing futures contracts in which positions are periodically
marked to market and the resulting obligations are satisfied by cash payments, known as variation
margin. See non-cash clearing and variation margin.
Central counterparty: an entity that is the buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer of
a specified set of contracts, e.g. those executed on a particular exchange or exchanges.
Clearing link: an arrangement in which the same contract is traded on exchanges affiliated with
two clearing houses, but all positions are transferred daily to a single clearing house where they
are carried until expiration or offsetting. See mutual offsetting system.
Clearing house: a department of an exchange or a separate legal entity that provides a range
of services related to the clearance and settlement of trades on the exchange and the
management of risks associated with the resulting contracts. A clearing house is often central
counterparty to all trades on the exchange, i.e. the buyer to every seller and the seller to every
buyer.
Clearing member: a member of a clearing house. All trades must be settled through a clearing
member. A direct clearing member is able to settle only its own obligations. A general clearing
member is able to settle its own obligations as well as those of clients. Variations of these two
types of clearing member may also exist.
Client: a party that is not a member of the clearing house and must settle through a clearing
member. Also known as customer.
Close-out: the process of offsetting existing contracts. Close-out may be used by the clearing
house to prevent further losses from positions carried by an entity that has defaulted.
Credit risk: the risk that a counterparty (such as a clearing member) will not settle an
obligation for full value, either when due or at any time thereafter. Credit risk includes
replacement cost risk and principal risk.
Custody risk: the risk of a loss of securities held in custody occasioned by the insolvency,
negligence or fraudulent action of the custodian or of a sub-custodian.
Default: failure to satisfy an obligation on time. More generally, a clearing house may declare a
member in default in a variety of circumstances, including a failure to satisfy obligations on time,
insolvency, suspension of trading privileges on an exchange for which the clearing house provides
services, or other events that the clearing house deems to have had a material adverse effect on
the member’s capacity to meet its obligations.
Delivery versus payment: a link between a securities transfer system and a funds transfer
system that ensures that delivery occurs if, and only if, payment occurs.
Derivative: an instrument whose value is determined by the value of an underlying asset.
Exchange member: a member of an exchange with certain trading privileges. An exchange
member may not necessarily be a member of the exchange’s clearing house.
Final: irrevocable and unconditional.
Glossary
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underlying asset at a specific price and date in the future.
Futures contract: a standardised forward contract traded on an exchange.
Haircut:  the difference between the market value of a security and its collateral value. The
haircut is intended to protect a lender of funds or securities from losses owing to declines in
collateral values.
Initial margin: cash or collateral that is deposited with the clearing house to ensure
performance on obligations vis-à-vis it. Also known as performance bond and original margin.
Legal risk: the risk of loss because of the unexpected application of a law or regulation or
because a contract cannot be enforced.
Liquidity risk: the risk that a counterparty (such as a clearing member) will not settle an
obligation for full value when due. Liquidity risk does not imply that a clearing member is
insolvent since it may be able to settle its obligations at some unspecified time thereafter.
Margin: see initial margin and variation margin.
Market risk: the risk of losses in on and off-balance-sheet positions arising from movements in
market prices.
Mutual offsetting system: a link between clearing houses in which positions entered into on
one exchange can be, but need not be, transferred to the clearing house of another exchange,
and vice versa. See clearing link.
Omnibus account: a single account for the commingled funds or positions of multiple parties.
A clearing member will often maintain an omnibus account at the clearing house for all of its
clients. In this case, the clearing member is responsible for maintaining account records for
individual clients.
Operational risk: the risk of human error or a breakdown of some component of the
hardware, software or communications systems that is critical to settlement.
Options contract: a contract that gives the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to either
buy or sell an underlying asset, depending on the type of option, by a certain date for a certain
price. For this right, the buyer pays the seller a “premium”.
Over the counter (OTC): a method of trading that does not involve an exchange. In OTC
markets, participants trade directly with each other, typically through telephone or computer
links.
Position limit: a restriction on the number of contracts or share of a contract’s open interest
that a single entity may hold.
Principal risk (or delivery risk): the risk that the seller of a security delivers a security, but
does not receive payment, or that the buyer of a security makes payment, but does not receive
delivery. In this event, the full principal value of the securities or funds transferred is at risk. See
also credit risk.
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transfers individually on an order-by-order basis.
Replacement cost risk: the risk that a counterparty to an outstanding transaction for
completion on a future date will fail to perform on the settlement date. The resulting exposure
is the cost of replacing, at current market prices, the original transaction. See credit risk.
Segregation: a method of protecting client assets and positions by holding or accounting for
them separately from those of the carrying firm or broker.
Settlement bank: either a central bank or a private bank used to effect money settlements.
Substitution:  the substitution of one party for another in respect of an obligation. In the
context of a futures or options clearing house, the term usually refers to the interposition of the
clearing house as buyer to the seller of a contract and as seller to the buyer.
Systemic risk: the risk that the failure of one participant in a payment or settlement system,
or in financial markets generally, to meet its required obligations when due will cause other
participants or financial institutions to be unable to meet their obligations (including settlement
obligations in a transfer system) when due. Such a failure may cause significant liquidity or credit
problems and might, as a result, threaten the stability of financial markets.
Trade matching: the process of matching trade details (such as the number of contracts, the
contract month and price) submitted by the trade counterparties. The clearing house often
guarantees a trade at the time it is successfully matched.
Trade registration: the process by which matched trades are formally recorded in the books
of the clearing house. For clearing houses that act as central counterparties, registration may also
be the time at which the clearing house substitutes itself as counterparty to the clearing
members.
Unwinding (or settlement unwind): a procedure followed in certain payment and settlement
systems in which transfers of securities or funds are settled on a net basis, at the end of the
processing cycle, with all transfers remaining provisional until all participants have discharged
their settlement obligations. If a participant fails to settle, some or all of the provisional transfers
involving that participant are deleted from the system and the settlement obligations from the
remaining transfers are then recalculated.
Value at risk: an estimate of the upper bound on losses an institution would expect to incur
during a given period (e.g. one day) for a given confidence level (e.g. 95%).
Variation margin: funds that are paid to (or received from) a counterparty (clearing house or
clearing member) to settle any losses (gains) that are implied by marking open positions to
market. In some markets, the term is also used to describe the transfer of collateral to (from) a
counterparty to cover an initial margin deficit (surplus) in a non-cash clearing or options-style
margining system.
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